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INTRODUCTION
The notion that pretrial discovery should be
"proportional" to the specific needs of each case is once again
at the forefront of civil litigation. Drawing on widespread
concerns that excessive discovery can saddle litigants with
extraordinary cost and burden, several respected legal
organizations have recently called for discovery to be
expressly limited by application of a proportionality
principle.1 Courts, too, have increasingly wrangled with the
best way to control the excesses of modern discovery,2
pleading with parties to act "responsibly" by narrowly
tailoring the type, sequence, and volume of discovery in a
manner appropriate to their particular case. Many scholars
have likewise lent their support to proportionality-based
discovery restrictions.4 And the proportionality standard has
1. Among those advancing this position is my former organization, the
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System at the University
of Denver (IAALS). See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON
DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL
REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS
TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 7 (rev. 2009) [hereinafter ACTL/IAALS FINAL
REPORT] ("Proportionality should be the most important principle applied to all
discovery."). IAALS and the ACTL are but two of many organizations dedicated
to a proportionality regime. See The Sedona Conference Commentary on
Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 289, 291 (2010); see
also, e.g., LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., RESHAPING THE RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE NEED FOR CLEAR, CONCISE, AND
MEANINGFUL AMENDMENTS TO THE KEY RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 30-31
(2010); SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE ABA SECTION OF LITIG., CIVIL PROCEDURE
IN THE 21ST CENTURY: SOME PROPOSALS 3 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 ABA
REPORT].
2. Most notably, the Supreme Court recently discussed the impact of
discovery costs in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 558-59 (2007).
For detailed analyses at the district court level, see, for example, Hopson v.
Mayor and City Council of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 2005); Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 317-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
3. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 358 (D. Md.
2008).
4. Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy:
Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 409-10
(2011); Peter B. Rutledge, The Proportionality Principle and the (Amount in)
Controversy, in THE AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE RULE OF LAw (F.H.
Buckley ed., Yale University Press) (forthcoming 2012); John L. Carroll,
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even caught on in other common law countries.5 Everywhere,
it seems, proportionality is the watchword of the day.
Despite this widespread support, the promise of
"proportional" discovery in every civil case is as far away as
ever. The legal community cannot even develop a clear and
consistent definition of the key term.6  Rather,
"proportionality" has taken on an "I know it when I see it"
quality, 7 subsuming a variety of interrelated, immeasurable,
and seemingly contradictory relationships between the
volume, cost, burden, or potential value of discovery on the
one hand, and the amount in controversy, resources of the
parties, importance of the issues, importance of requested
discovery, and/or "needs of the case" on the other. Even
among experienced judges and lawyers, one can never be sure
whether "disproportionate" discovery means the same thing
to different people-and even if it does, there is no clear way
to communicate that meaning to those who lack significant
practice experience.
More importantly, efforts to control the cost and volume
of discovery by rule have largely failed. In the early 1980s, a
consensus emerged that "disproportionate" discovery
(however the term was understood) was caused by the abuse
of attorney discretion.8 In light of this consensus, rulemakers
have repeatedly amended the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to reduce attorney control and increase judicial
Proportionality in Discovery: A Cautionary Tale, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 455,
460-61 (2010); Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but
Could Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age,
58 DUKE L.J. 889, 909-10 (2009) (collecting positions of various academics);
Gordon W. Netzorg & Tobin D. Kern, Proportional Discovery: Making It the
Norm, Rather than the Exception, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 513, 513 (2010)
(containing a practitioner's viewpoint).
5. Overriding Objective C.P.R. 1.1, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (1999), available
at http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/courts-and-tribunals/courts/procedure-
rules/civil/contents/parts/part0l.htm (making proportionality the "overriding
objective" of the civil justice system in the United Kingdom); Craig P. Dennis,
Proportionality: A More Effective Tool 3 (September 29, 2005) (unpublished
discussion paper), available at http://www.bcjusticereview.orgworking-.groups/
civiljusticelcle-paper_09_2905.pdf (describing the new proportionality rule in
British Columbia).
6. See, e.g., ACTLIAALS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 10 ("Efforts to
limit discovery must begin with definition of the type of discovery that is
permissible, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to write that definition in a way
that will satisfy everyone or that will work in all cases.").
7. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
8. See infra Part I.A.
2012] 147
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control over the discovery process. These amendments,
however, have had virtually no impact on problematic levels
of discovery. The percentage of federal civil cases that
experience particularly expensive or voluminous discovery
has barely changed over the last half-century, 9 and
contemporary attorneys are unconvinced that the
amendments, taken together, have meaningfully improved
the problems of discovery abuse.10 Perhaps most telling, the
very people who championed discovery rules designed to curb
attorney discretion in the first place have reluctantly
concluded that such rules "produced only a ripple in the case
law"" and have "been largely ignored" by attorneys and
judges alike.12
Faced with this discouraging evidence, the modern
impulse has been to redouble existing efforts. Judges today
are urged to become even more involved in discovery,
substituting their discretion for that of attorneys at earlier
and more frequent stages of the discovery process. 3 In
addition, some commentators have proposed even more
stringent rules to further restrict attorney control over the
use of specific discovery tools. 14
Unfortunately, these additional limitations on attorney
discretion are unlikely to work. In practice, limiting attorney
discretion has proven to be both a vastly underinclusive
solution to the problem of disproportionate discovery (in that
tighter restrictions historically have not reduced instances of
excessive discovery) and a vastly overinclusive one (in that
the great majority of civil cases do not need such restrictions
to keep discovery under control). After nearly thirty years of
trying to achieve proportionality by restricting attorney
discretion during the discovery process, it is time to conclude
that our focus has been misplaced.
This Article offers an entirely different approach to the
problem of disproportionate discovery, by viewing the
9. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., ACTLIJAALS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
11. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2008.1 (3d ed. 2011).
12. Transcript of the "Alumni" Panel on Discovery Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV.
809, 815 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 4, at 461.
14. See, e.g., ACTLIAALS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 8-12; 2010 ABA
REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-14.
148 [Vol. 52
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problem through the lens of legal culture. Specifically, I
argue that disproportionate discovery is caused not by abuse
of attorney discretion, but by a breakdown of the core values
and cultural norms that typically animate civil litigation in
the United States. Faith in core values such as access to
justice, adjudication on the merits, efficiency, and
predictability ordinarily motivates lawyers to tailor the scope
and volume of their discovery requests appropriately without
judicial intervention. It is when these values are not strongly
held that two forms of disproportionate discovery emerge.
Excessive discovery stems from an inadequate commitment to
the culture's core values, leading to sloppy or unfocused
behavior during the discovery process. Abusive discovery
arises from a commitment to an entirely different set of
values (such as intimidation, stonewalling, and exploitation of
economic differences) that are anathema to the ordinary civil
litigation culture.
Attorney discretion does have a role to play in excessive
and abusive discovery, but not the one the Federal Rules
contemplate. Discretion is merely the mechanism by which
an attorney's fidelity to core values is converted into concrete
behavior. When attorneys strongly believe in the core values
of civil litigation, their exercise of discretion results in focused
queries and cooperative behavior that work to streamline the
discovery process. By contrast, when attorneys do not
strongly believe in the culture's core values, their exercise of
discretion results in uncooperative behavior and poorly
focused discovery requests.
Understanding the relationship between faith in core
values, attorney discretion, and attorney behavior helps
explain why proportionality cannot be achieved simply by
restricting attorney discretion during the discovery process.
The exercise of discretion is essential to the discovery process,
regardless of whether the discovery is ultimately focused or
excessive. Limiting discretion in all cases may constrain the
handful of attorneys who are prone to excessive or abusive
discovery practices but, much more significantly, it also
constrains the vast majority of attorneys who act thoughtfully
and ethically. Restricting discretion universally, in short, is
too blunt a tool. It may stop some excessive or abusive
discovery, but it badly hampers the ability of attorneys to
engage in efficient discovery as well.
20121
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Attorneys and judges have internalized this conclusion,
and accordingly employ the proportionality provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure infrequently and without
rigor or enthusiasm. Their mindset will not permit them to
institutionalize limits on attorney discretion that ultimately
hurt their ability to foster efficient and predictable results.
Contrary to common perception, then, it is not simply that
counsel and the courts choose not to employ the
proportionality rules on a regular basis; it is that collectively
they are culturally incapable of doing so.
This Article explores the cultural foundation of
proportionality, and the consequences of that foundation, as
follows. Part I develops a cultural model of proportionality,
which describes the core values of the litigation culture that
ordinarily work to keep discovery under control, and
identifies broad attorney discretion as the primary
mechanism for translating those values into constructive and
cooperative attorney behavior. Within this framework, I
explain why instances of excessive and abusive discovery
should not be viewed as a problem with the mere exercise of
attorney discretion. Rather, excessive discovery should be
seen as resulting from an erosion of faith in civil litigation's
core values, and abusive discovery as resulting from a
wholesale rejection of those values. Part II demonstrates why
the existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unwittingly
undermine the prevailing cultural ethos by identifying
attorney discretion, rather than the lack of faith in core
values, as the culprit when discovery becomes excessive or
abusive. Part III proposes a different set of protocols and
practices more in line with the prevailing cultural model,
which is designed to steer would-be "disproportionate
discoverers" back into the mainstream.
I. THE CULTURAL FOUNDATION OF PROPORTIONALITY
A. Disproportionate Discovery in Context: Observations from
Easy Cases
Civil rulemakers have traditionally focused their
attention on cases that experience particularly costly or
voluminous discovery. This is perfectly understandable.
Discovery requests that go far beyond the reasonable needs of
a case unnecessarily increase the cost of litigation, prolong
[Vol. 52150
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the discovery process, and raise the likelihood of discovery
motion practice. Of even greater concern, some instances of
disproportionate discovery contribute to costs and delays so
prohibitive that it forces one or more parties to settle for
reasons unrelated to the merits of the case.'5 Cases with
extraordinary levels of discovery also carry vivid anecdotal
value, as attorneys and clients share stories about multi-week
depositions, 16  million-dollar invoices for restoring
electronically stored information, 7 and similar horrors years
after they originally took place.
Yet the fact remains that cases with disproportionate
discovery are rare. Empirical studies stretching back to the
mid-1960s have consistently concluded that discovery is
extensive or burdensome only in a small percentage of civil
cases, and that in many civil cases, perhaps even a majority,
no discovery takes place at all.'" Even traditionally complex
15. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 559. In a survey of highly experienced
litigators, seventy-one percent of respondents indicated their belief that counsel
use discovery as a tool to force settlement. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK
FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS.,
INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM A-4 (2008) [hereinafter
ACTL/IAALS INTERIM REPORT].
16. E.g., Proctor v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, No. 81 C
4938, 1987 WL 13431, *2 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 26, 1987) (thirteen-day deposition of
plaintiff); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 173 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(eighteen-day deposition of one witness, for which attorneys billed nearly 1500
hours of preparation).
17. E.g., Quinby v. WestLB AG, No. 04 Civ 7406, 2005 WL 3453908, *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2005) (estimating $2.8 million to restore backup tapes);
Medtronic Sofamore Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 558 (W.D. Tenn.
2003) ("several million" dollars for same); Rowe Entm't., Inc. v. William Morris
Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (estimating $9.75 million for
same); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. Civ.A. 99-3564, 2002 WL
246439, *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002) ($6.2 million for same).
18. See PAUL R. CONNOLLY, EDITH A. HOLLEMAN & MICHAEL J. KUHLMAN,
JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 28-29
tbl.9 (Federal Judicial Center 1978) (stating that about 52% of cases in a
Federal Judicial Center study had no recorded discovery requests); WILLIAM A.
GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 162-81 (Russell
Sage Found., 1968) (describing the 1965 Columbia Field Study's conclusions
that "very high" discovery costs were unusual and concentrated in a minority of
high-stakes cases); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT:
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA 27
(1998) (no lawyer work hours on discovery were reported in 38% of cases in a
RAND study); EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, CASE-BASED CIVIL
RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
HeinOnline  -- 52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 151 2012
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cases have, on average, fewer discovery events and fewer
discovery disputes than might otherwise be thought. For
example, antitrust cases are widely acknowledged to be
among the most discovery-intensive case types and the ones
most prone to abuse and discovery disputes. 19 Yet a study of
antitrust cases in five judicial districts in the 1980s found no
evidence of interrogatories, document requests, or deposition
notices issued by the plaintiff or the defendant in
approximately half of the cases.2 ° A 2009 study of civil
dockets in eight federal district courts found an average of
only 1.12 motions on disputed discovery per antitrust case,
0.66 motions per patent case, and 0.22 motions per securities
case.2' These motions were filed at higher rates than in other
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 27 fig.13 (2009) (showing that 56.6% of plaintiffs
counsel and 68.8% of defense counsel felt that the discovery process generated
"just the right amount" of information for their case); THOMAS E. WILLGING ET
AL., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR
CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF COUNSEL IN CLOSED FEDERAL
CIVIL CASES 14-15 (Federal Judicial Center 1998) (finding that total spending
on discovery was relatively low for most cases); Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the
Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil
Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217, 229-30 (1980) (concluding that
discovery costs and abuses predominated in larger, more complex cases); Susan
Keilitz et al., Is Civil Discovery in State Trial Courts Out of Control?, 17 ST. CT.
J. 8, 10 tbl.2 (1993) (finding that 42% of cases in a five-state study had no
recorded discovery, and only 14% of cases had eleven or more discovery
requests); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of
Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences of Unfounded Rulemaking, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1439 (1994) (describing an unpublished 1982 FJC study
that suggested that most cases were "free from abuses of the discovery
process."); Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(a)-"Much Ado About Nothing?," 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 697
(1995); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 72, 89-90 (1983) (finding in a University of Wisconsin study that no
discovery occurred in more than half of the 1649 state and federal cases
reviewed); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and
Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rules Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV.
525, 538 (1998) (75% of attorneys in case sample reported deposing seven
individuals or fewer, far below the limits of Rule 30).
19. See, e.g., Leon R. Yankwich, Annotation, "Short Cuts" in Long Cases: A
Commentary on the Report Entitled Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other
Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 49-55 (1953); Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 558; Car
Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984).
20. See PAUL V. TEPLITZ, The Georgetown Project: An Overview of the Data
Set and Its Collection, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW
LEARNING 61, 72 tbl.2.5 (Lawrence J. White ed., MIT Press 1988).
21. See INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM, CIVIL CASE PROCESSING IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ANALYSIS, 97 app. D (2009). "Motions on disputed
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PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY
case types, but the absolute numbers were still quite low. 22
Either discovery events are not occurring with great
frequency in these cases, or the proffered requests and
responses are not egregious enough to generate disputes that
require the court's attention.
These two fundamental characteristics of cases with
disproportionate discovery-rarity and severity-frequently
combine to hamper meaningful discussion about
proportionality. In one camp, attorneys who have directly
experienced excessive or abusive discovery argue that more
stringent proportionality measures are needed, and that even
a rare occurrence of excess is too much.23 In the other camp,
empiricists maintain that the problem is more or less
restricted to a small number of cases, and that changes to the
Federal Rules are unnecessary.24 The result has been a
stalemate, in which practitioners with a bad discovery
experience are told that the problem is not common enough to
raise general concerns, and empiricists are told that their
aggregate numbers do not adequately reflect the disruptive
effect of disproportionate discovery in real cases.
One way to break this longstanding stalemate is to shift
the frame of reference and focus instead on the vast majority
of civil cases that do not experience disproportionate
discovery. These "easy" cases offer valuable lessons about the
way attorneys naturally control the level of discovery to keep
it within accepted bounds. Under the current Federal Rules,
a party could demand ten depositions, promulgate twenty-five
interrogatories, and require the production of thousands, or
even millions, of documents without running afoul of any
particular rule or judicial edict. Yet these outer bounds of
discovery volume are rarely encountered; there is "something
in the soil" of civil litigation culture that ordinarily causes
attorneys to self-limit their discovery requests.25
discovery" were defined in the study to include motions to compel, quash, strike
a discovery response, or sanction a party. Id. at 44.
22. See id. at 97 app. D.
23. See, e.g., ACTL/IAALS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
24. E.g., Emery G. Lee, III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of
Cost in Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 779-86 (2010).
25. PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, SOMETHING IN THE SOIL: LEGACIES AND
RECKONINGS IN THE NEW WEST 28 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2001) ("[The American]
West has had a very full life as an abstraction, an ideal, and a dream. And yet
the West is also actual, material, and substantial."). The same can be said for
2012]
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Understanding the cases in which discovery is not a problem
may be the key to controlling cases in which discovery is, or
could become, a problem.
The easy cases are particularly valuable because they can
be found in every case type, every court, and every era.
Indeed, easy cases made up the majority of civil cases long
before the Federal Rules were amended to restrict attorney
discretion over the timing and volume of discovery tools,
suggesting convincingly that rules alone are not responsible
for attorney self-control in the conduct of discovery.26 By
examining the easy cases, one can identify the characteristics
of the civil litigation culture that naturally foster proportional
discovery, as well as the conditions in which those
characteristics evaporate.
Deriving insights from easy cases begins with identifying
observable attorney behaviors that are associated with
controlled discovery. Three such behaviors are readily
apparent. First, attorneys in cases with "proportional"
discovery begin thinking comprehensively about the
evidentiary needs of the case at a very early stage in the
litigation. They formulate thoughtful discovery plans,
organize the sequencing of discovery to hone in on the most
promising information, and draft narrowly focused discovery
requests that cut to the heart of the dispute. Second, these
attorneys refer to past experience with similar case types to
determine the most productive discovery tools for the instant
case. Far from reinventing the wheel, they rely on lessons
learned in previous cases to seek out information efficiently.
Finally, attorneys regard cooperation with opposing counsel
during the discovery phase to be in their own interest. They
see no inconsistency between cooperative and professional
relationships with opposing counsel on the one hand, and
zealous advocacy for their client on the other. They focus
their attention on the substantive application of the law in
the case, not on procedural gamesmanship.
These behaviors share two important characteristics.
First, they occur naturally in easy cases, meaning that
American civil litigation, whose practices and ideals deftly straddle the mythical
and the mundane.
26. See CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 18, at 28-29; GLASER, supra note 18,
at 162-81; Brazil, supra note 18, at 229-30.
27. For further discussion on these behaviors, see infra Part I.B.3.
154 [Vol. 52
HeinOnline  -- 52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 154 2012
PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY
lawyers engage in such activities without being required to do
so by rule or judicial fiat. Second, all three behaviors are
designed to move the case toward a substantive result
(whether settlement or final adjudication) in a predictable,
efficient and fair way. This is no accident. Fairness,
efficiency, predictability, and related ideals are the core
values of American civil litigation-values that are
fundamental to the operation of the American civil justice
system as we know it. For attorneys, resolutions that are
fair, efficient and predictable are a matter of professional self-
interest, as well as the bedrock of justice and the rule of law.
The relative scarcity of cases with excessive or abusive
discovery might well be attributed to the faith that most
attorneys place in the importance of these core values, and
the way in which they ordinarily employ their discretion
during the discovery process to promote those values.
The cultural path from the core values of American civil
litigation to the behavioral manifestations that keep
discovery in check has not been explored before. The
remainder of this part sets out a detailed but still preliminary
sketch of how it works, with a particular focus on the role of
attorney discretion in encouraging and preserving fair,
efficient, and predictable processes. Understanding the
relationship between proportionality, core values, and
attorney discretion in easy cases lays the groundwork for
identifying the causes of excessive or abusive discovery, and
developing methods to restore the proper balance.
B. A Cultural Model of Civil Litigation
1. Civil Litigation's Core Values
The concept of "legal culture" "refers to patterns of
interpretation and behavioural routines regarding law."2" It
is, in other words, a set of reasonable expectations about how,
when, and under what circumstances the law will be
interpreted and applied, and a set of observable behaviors
that reflect those expectations. Lawrence M. Friedman,
whose groundbreaking work in this area is particularly
extensive, has offered a somewhat more detailed definition of
28. Bradly Condon, NAFTA at Three-and-One-Half Years: Where Do We
Stand and Where Should We Be Headed? A Cross-Cultural Analysis of North
American Legal Integration, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 347, 353 (1997).
2012]
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legal culture as the prevailing "legal consciousness-
attitudes, values, beliefs, and expectations about the law and
the legal system" within a community. 29 Lynn LoPucki
captures the idea with a pithier phrase: legal culture is "the
law in lawyers' heads."3"
Although its precise structure and dimensions remain
subject to debate,3' certain generally agreed upon
characteristics of legal culture can be defined with confidence.
Any culture, legal cultures included, is animated by one or
more core values or beliefs.32 As one set of scholars explains,
"each culture possesses a number of basic characteristics
which are essential for the transmission and maintenance of
that culture; these core values identify a given culture." "
Core values provide participants in the culture with collective
baseline expectations about how they are to behave and how
their community is to function, and continued participation in
the culture requires acceptance of and adherence to those
values. J.J. Smolicz, a noted scholar of education and culture,
has explained that "[c]ore values can be regarded as forming
one of the most fundamental components of a group's culture.
They generally represent the heartland of the group's
ideological system and act as identifying values which are
symbolic of the group and its membership."34
29. Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber, Introduction to LEGAL
CULTURE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 1 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N.
Scheiber eds., Westview Press 1996).
30. Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in
Lawyers' Heads, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1498 (1996).
31. The concept of legal culture has been, at times, elusive and
controversial. It has been complicated by its extensive use in the comparative
law context, where legal culture abuts other cultural phenomena such as
language, religion, and national identity. For a rich example of the extent of the
debate, see generally COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES passim (David Nelken ed.,
Dartmouth 1997) (containing a series of essays seeking to clarify-and
sometimes complicate-the meaning of legal culture through comparative
studies).
32. See, e.g., Condon, supra note 28, at 353; Roger Cotterrell, Conscientious
Objection to Assigned Work Tasks: A Comment on Relations of Law and Culture,
31 COMP. LAB. L. & POLY J. 511, 512 (2010) ("Culture can be thought of as a
complex aggregate of many elements-[including] shared beliefs and ultimate
values."); James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, The Legal Cultures of
Europe, 30 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 55, 56 (1996) (conceiving of legal cultures as a
"broad syndrome of values").
33. JOSIANE F. HAMERS & MICHEL H.A. BLANC, BILINGUALITY AND
BILINGUALISM 203 (2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
34. JERZY JAROSLAW SMOLICZ, J.J. SMOLICZ ON EDUCATION AND CULTURE
[Vol. 52156
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Core values are "superordinate to all other beliefs,"
individual or otherwise, in the culture2 They provide the
fundamental framework for the culture's operation. Core
values often take the form of language, religion, or family
structure,36 but core values need not be religious, moral, or
even expressly ethical, as long as they represent shared
expectations of common purpose. Moreover, some core values
may take precedence over others. As Smolicz notes, "[iun
considering the nature of core values in a particular culture it
is important to remember that more than one core value may
be involved, and that it may be possible to establish a relative
hierarchy of importance among them. 37
Core values are so fundamental to a culture's identity
that they must be accepted on their own terms. One who
rejects a culture's core values, or accepts them only
superficially, may be excluded from the group or feel unable
to continue as a member .3  For example, one who believes
strongly in a pantheon of gods cannot meaningfully be a
member of a culture whose dominant core value is
monotheism. Similarly, it is hard to imagine anyone
successfully participating in the broad culture of American
dispute resolution without maintaining at least an abstract
belief in the values that animate that culture-"liberty,
individualism, egalitarianism, populism, and anti-statism; in
sum, . . . the 'competitive individualism' so highly valued in
America."39  Lip service to core values is not enough. An
attorney who, for instance, wholly rejects egalitarianism or
who attempts to redefine the term in a manner contrary to
general notions of human equality will not be accepted into
the broader American legal culture for very long. Such
individuals are cultural outliers; they may interact with the
dominant culture and even embrace some of its mannerisms
and terminology, but are not part of the culture's
constituency.
105 (Margaret Secombe & Joseph Zajda eds., James Nicholas Publishers 1999).
35. NINA JACOB, INTERCULTURAL MANAGEMENT 107 (Kogan Page Limited
2003) (discussing core values in the context of multinational corporations).
36. See SMOLICZ, supra note 34, at 106-12.
37. Id. at 106.
38. Id.
39. Oscar G. Chase, American "Exceptionalism" and Comparative
Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 284 (2002).
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The broader legal culture may be parsed into a variety of
related and overlapping subcultures. Professor Friedman
argues that "[e]very community has a legal culture,"4" and it
is indeed possible to identify several distinct subcultures
within the broader American legal culture-each
characterized by their members' professional position, area of
practice, or geographic location. Friedman, for example,
notes that "[o]ne particularly important subculture is the
legal culture of 'insiders,' that is, the judges and lawyers who
work inside the legal system itself."41 One might divide this
"insider" culture even further to separate out different
subcultures for legal practitioners,42 judges,43 and court
staff,44 each with slightly differing emphasis depending on the
participants' role in the legal process. Similarly, one can
identify different practice area subcultures for, among others,
civil litigation, criminal justice, alternative dispute
resolution45 and transactional law, separated from each other
40. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 21 (2d ed.
W.W. Norton & Co. 1998).
41. Id.
42. On the sub-culture for legal practitioners, see, for example, Executive
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Statement of
Position on Multidisciplinary Practice, 54 RECORD ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 585, 596
(1999) (identifying the core values of "independence of judgment, loyalty to the
client, preservation of confidences, competence, avoiding improper solicitation,
and support for pro bono activities and improving the legal system"); see also
Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice:
Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values
Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1117 (2000) (alluding to the same core values).
The core values are "independence of judgment, loyalty to the client,
preservation of confidences, competence, avoiding improper solicitation, and
support for pro bono activities and improving the legal system." Id.
43. See, e.g., Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as Franchise: Rethinking the
Justification for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 139-46
(2009) (discussing the characteristics of state and federal judicial culture).
44. See, e.g., W. Warren H. Binford et al., Seeking Best Practices Among
Intermediate Courts of Appeal: A Nascent Journey, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
37, 113 (2007) ("The culture and collegiality existing between judges and court
staff presumably plays a significant role in they way a given court operates
.... "); Carolyn Shapiro, The Law Clerk Proxy Wars: Secrecy, Accountability,
and Ideology in the Supreme Court, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 101, 128 (2009)
(describing the culture of Supreme Court law clerks as leading them "to be
unduly stingy with their certiorari grant recommendations.").
45. On the sub-culture of mediation, see, for example, Beryl Blaustone, The
Conflicts of Diversity, Justice, and Peace in the Theories of Dispute Resolution: A
Myth: Bridge Makers Who Face the Great Mystery, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 253, 258
(1994) (identifying as core values the promotion of individual self-actualization,
responsibility for one's actions, empowerment of the individual to decide what
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by different rules and procedures, procedural expectations,
and points of emphasis. Further, the local legal culture (and
with it, expectations about the timing, goals, and mechanisms
of legal processes) may differ among geographic locations.46
Each of these subcultures remains committed to the values of
the broader legal culture, but may emphasize these values or
train individual behavior somewhat differently.
Our focus here is the subculture of American civil
litigation, whose membership consists of attorneys, judges,
litigants and others who are repeat participants in the
American civil litigation process and accordingly have some
sort of investment (professional, financial, emotional, or
otherwise) in its successful functioning. Participants in this
subculture will almost always also be participants in the
broader American legal culture,47 and likely are members of
other legal subcultures as well.48 What makes civil litigation
a distinct subculture is the way it embraces and prioritizes
the core values of the broader American legal culture in a
manner different from any other subculture in the American
legal system.49
Civil litigation's selection and prioritization of core values
is unique. Broader values like liberty and populism are
sharpened in the subculture of civil litigation into core values
such as access to justice,50 pursuing justice,51 notice,52 zealous
should happen in the future, and "responsibility to act in ways that
acknowledge previous understandings").
46. See LoPucki, supra note 30, at 1501-02; Theresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth
Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal Culture:
Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 801, 804 (1994).
47. Exceptions may include foreign litigants whose connections to the
United States as a whole, and specifically its civil justice system, are limited
and infrequent.
48. Legal subcultures are not exclusive, and any participant in the
American legal system may be at once a member of several different,
overlapping subcultures. A judge on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, for
example, may influence and be influenced by the respective subcultures of the
judiciary, the criminal justice bar, and the local legal culture of the Texas state
courts.
49. Prioritization of core values occurs in all subcultures, not just those
within the American legal subculture. For example, Smolicz describes the
importance of the Italian language as a core value of the Italian culture, but
notes that "among rural Southern Italians at least, the importance of the family
as a cultural value may even transcend that of language." SMOLICZ, supra note
34, at 106.
50. John L. Carroll, Value-Based Deaning, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 327, 329
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advocacy,53  litigant participation, 4  adjudication on the
merits, efficiency,56 predictability,57 and the rule of law, 8
among others. These values are closely intertwined. They
reflect a fundamental commitment to a fair and efficient
resolution of each case on the merits, after adequate
participation in a process with a well-defined set of rules and
norms. Collectively, these values also help explain why
"proportionality" has resisted concrete definition. Members of
the civil litigation subculture use "proportionality" as a
shorthand for pretrial discovery that adheres to the culture's
core values-that is, discovery that advances a case efficiently
and predictably toward a resolution on the merits. Just as
terms like "freedom" and "equality" are difficult to define in
the abstract yet imbued with cultural meaning, so too is
"proportionality." It is a single term that reflects a rich and
nuanced web of values.
(2009) (citing to values of the legal profession identified by American Bar
Association President Tommy Wells); see also Daniel Friedson, An Access to
Justice Case Study: A Practitioner's Call for Leadership in Implementing
Homeownership Legal Clinics and Equity Protection Partnerships, 15 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 499, 500 (2010).
51. Friedson, supra note 50, at 500; see also Karen H. Rothenberg,
Recalibrating the Moral Compass: Expanding "Thinking Like a Lawyer" into
"Thinking Like a Leader," 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 411, 416 (2009).
52. A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 18-21 (2009).
53. Barry R. Temkin, Misrepresentation by Omission in Settlement
Negotiations: Should There Be a Silent Safe Harbor?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
179, 191 (2004).
54. See Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1977).
55. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 3-4 (2010); Jamelle C.
Sharpe, Beyond Borders: Dissembling the State-Based Model of Federal Forum
Fairness, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2897, 2911 (2009).
56. Spencer, supra note 52, at 18, 21-23 (discussing efficiency as a core
value in the context of pleading); see also John H. Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825, 846-47 (1985)
(arguing that increased judicial control of the fact-gathering process would
"eliminate" wasted time and money).
57. See Peter Marguilies, After Marek, the Deluge: Harmonizing the
Interaction Under Rule 68 of Statutes that Do and Do Not Classify Attorneys'
Fees as "Costs," 73 IOWA L. REV. 413, 427 (1988).
58. Carroll, supra note 50, at 329 (quoting Tommy Wells, the President of
American Bar Association).
[Vol. 52
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2. The Critical Role of Attorney Discretion
The core values that give life to a culture are necessarily
abstract, and must be given effect through concrete behavior.
It is not enough to say, for example, "Be predictable";
participants in the civil justice system must work to foster
predictability in every case. In the civil litigation subculture,
the mechanism that converts core values into like-minded
behavior is the thoughtful use of attorney discretion. Based
on their training, experience, and understanding of the law
and the players in the civil justice system, attorneys are
afforded broad leeway to develop and maintain a litigation
strategy that best serves the interests of their clients.
Because each case presents different facts, players,
evidentiary hurdles, client expectations, and strategies, civil
litigation's core values are best served by providing attorneys
with wide latitude to act as they see fit.
To better understand the relationship between the core
values of civil litigation and the use of attorney discretion to
promote and nourish those values, consider an analogy to
commercial air travel. Regardless of one's role in the
"culture" of air travel-be it an airline executive, member of
the flight crew, airplane mechanic, airport screener, gate
agent, or passenger-the overarching goal (one might say,
"core value") of every commercial flight is to safely transport
everyone aboard the flight to the expected destination. There
are subsidiary values at work, to be sure-taking off and
landing on schedule, making sure all luggage arrives with the
passengers, having planes available for the next flight,
keeping prices competitive while still allowing airlines to be
profitable, building customer loyalty, etc.-but each of these
values is secondary to the paramount value of safe travel.
If safe travel is the goal, the discretion of trained and
experienced human pilots in flying the plane is the
mechanism to reach that goal. We rely on pilots to maneuver
the plane away from dangerous objects and weather; to take
off and land safely and smoothly; and to communicate with
control towers, each other, and the flight crew about the
status of the flight. In doing so, we allow pilots considerable
discretion in how they operate the plane: they may turn in a
different direction to avoid an accident, require passengers to
remain seated, delay a takeoff, or land in an unexpected
location if concerned about weather conditions or an on-board
20121
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emergency, and so on. Because pilots are granted a good deal
of discretion, we run the risk that a wayward pilot may
threaten a plane's safety, but we accept the general exercise
of pilot discretion because no other option better increases the
likelihood of achieving safe travel for all travelers.
The parallel argument applies to attorneys and the civil
justice system. We are willing to allow wide attorney
discretion in conducting pretrial activities because such
discretion is the best mechanism we have to promote the
ultimate goals (the core values) of a predictable, efficient, and
fair resolution on the merits. By contrast, restricting
attorney discretion in the pretrial phase makes it harder to
promote litigation's core values, because the very people in
the best position to nourish those values have less freedom to
do so. While unfettered attorney discretion surely carries
certain risks and consequences, core values are optimally
encouraged when such discretion is more or less freely
exercised.
3. Behavioral Manifestations of Attorney Discretion
During the discovery process, attorney discretion
translates faith in core values into tangible forms of attorney
behavior. Such forms of behavior are accepted as ordinary,
responsible, even necessary displays of attorney discretion in
furtherance of those values, though they are rarely thought of
expressly in those terms. To return to our airplane analogy,
common pilot behavior such as periodic checks of the
instrument panel, communicating with the control tower, and
raising and lowering the airplane's landing gear would be
considered typical manifestations of pilot discretion in
furtherance of the ultimate goal of safe travel.
In the context of discovery, attorneys likewise typically
act in ways that promote civil litigation's core values. As
noted earlier, three types of behavior are particularly
apparent: (1) early, systematic thinking about the discovery
needed to directly address disputed issues; (2) drawing upon
the litigation experience of oneself and others (both generally
and with respect to the specific type of case); and (3)
responding to the internal and external incentives to
cooperate with opposing counsel.59 The following subparts
59. See supra text accompanying note 27.
[Vol. 52162
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explain more fully how these behaviors ordinarily operate
during the discovery process to keep the scope and volume of
discovery at acceptable levels. While these behaviors
originate from a cultural demand for predictability, fairness
and efficiency, they are naturally self-reinforcing: for each
new generation of lawyers, the more the behaviors are used,
the more common and accepted they become.
i. Early Thinking About Discovery
The initial factor contributing to the promotion of civil
litigation's core values is counsel's willingness to think about
a case's specific evidentiary needs from the earliest stages of
litigation. As Judge Patrick Higgenbotham has explained,
this behavior requires the attorney to "start at the end"-i.e.,
to expressly consider what information will be necessary for a
closing argument at trial, and focus discovery on collecting
that information.60  His advice for judges who supervise
discovery contains an excellent explanation of how the
process should work:
I deployed as a district judge a technique I was taught as
a young trial lawyer: Write the charge early and outline
the closing argument you would like to make. In major
securities and antitrust litigation I insisted that counsel at
a very early stage develop the jury questions and a draft
charge. At first they were puzzled but they came to see
that it offered a guy wire to tie to a destination to which
all, including the tiers of underlings on the case, were to
be snapped. It is a non too subtle [sic] device for
constructing a benchmark for relevance otherwise absent
in discovery and to give confidence to decisions to not
chase every rabbit.61
Many lawyers will naturally include these types of
considerations as part of their initial case assessment, and
with good reason: identifying and narrowing issues early on
directly promotes case resolutions that are faster, cheaper,
and more closely tied to the substantive merits of the dispute.
Moreover, even among attorneys who might otherwise choose
60. Royal Furgeson, Civil Jury Trials R.I.P.? Can It Actually Happen in
America?, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 795, 819 (2009).
61. Id. (quoting E-mail from Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals, Fifth Circuit, to Royal Furgeson, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court, W. Dist. of
Tex. (May 16, 2008)).
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to push a full discovery analysis to a later date, developments
in the past decade are making early discovery assessment a
more regularly occurring phenomenon. For example, the
rapid growth of electronically stored information 2 and the
2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
designed to address that growth 63 have underscored to many
business entities the need to commence litigation holds from
the moment a lawsuit appears likely.64 The process used to
develop a litigation hold can serve as an initial template for
thinking about broader discovery needs in the case. The
bottom line is, cases will not be taken on unless they can be
done affordably, 65 and a responsible attorney will plan out
anticipated discovery as part of developing a larger case
strategy and developing a budget.
ii. Learning from Litigation Experience
A second form of attorney behavior designed to control
discovery is drawing lessons from practice experience. Over
the course of their careers, attorneys are likely to become
increasingly efficient at conducting discovery in any type of
case. This is partially due to trial and error;66 after dozens of
cases (and likely many fewer), an astute lawyer will
determine what types of information proved to be most
helpful for prevailing on summary judgment or trial, or
negotiating settlements. Experience will also help a lawyer
ascertain which forms of discovery are most cost-effective for
a particular case type. Even negative experiences are useful:
62. See INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM, NAVIGATING THE HAZARDS OF E-DISCOVERY: A MANUAL FOR STATE
COURT JUDGES 4 (2007).
63. Much has been written on the 2006 e-discovery amendments. For a
good overview, see Lee H. Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on Electronic Discovery
After December 1, 2006, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167, 167 (2006).
64. See INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM, THE EMERGING CHALLENGE OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: STRATEGIES
FOR AMERICAN BUSINESSES 9 (2008).
65. What is "affordable" varies from case to case and client to client, but
nearly all attorneys have a cutoff point at which it does not make economic
sense to proceed with the representation. See ACTL.IAALS INTERIM REPORT,
supra note 15, at A-6 ("[N]early 81% of [respondents] report[ed] that their firms
turn away cases when it is not cost-effective to handle them.").
66. No pun intended; lawyers who actually participate in a civil trial are,
sadly, a dying breed. For the latest statistics on the decline of civil trials, see
Marc Galanter & Angela Frozena, "A Grin Without a Cat:" Civil Trials in the
Federal Court 1-3 (May 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
[Vol. 52
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the collection in one's memory of those cases where discovery
was pursued too zealously-to the dissatisfaction of the judge,
client, or opposing counsel-is a powerful motivation.
Experience also promotes predictability in initial case
assessment. Initial case assessment considers the expected
value of the case, which, even in a rough form, can assist the
party and counsel in anticipating the amount of a monetary
award, setting parameters for settlement negotiations, and
constructing a litigation budget.67 It can also set boundaries
for the amount of money a party is willing to spend on
discovery. No rational party will spend more than he or she
believes the case to be worth, and many will opt for
settlement once a certain percentage of the anticipated case
value has been reached.6" Experienced attorneys tend to
understand more clearly the value of the case from an early
stage, and can craft a reasonable discovery plan and discovery
budget accordingly.69
Direct personal experience (or access to lessons from
another's experience) with particular case types is also
helpful in controlling discovery for two reasons. First,
attorneys are more likely to interact with a smaller subset of
the bar in their area of specialty, and therefore have less of
an incentive to jeopardize their professional and personal
relationships within that bar by demanding excessive
discovery or engaging in abusive practices.7 °  Second,
specialized substantive knowledge increases the likelihood
that an attorney will better understand critical aspects of the
case from an early stage, including the value of the case; the
likelihood of resolution by settlement, dispositive motion, or
trial; what issues are really in dispute; what facts need to be
marshaled to prove the case; and what discovery methods will
produce that information in the most efficient and expedient
67. See Mary G. Manetti, Controlling Outside Counsel Costs, in Managing a
Corporation's Law Department, at 117 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice,
Course Handbook Series No. 481, 1988).
68. See ROBERT G. BONE, THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 71-76
(Found. Press 2003).
69. For an extensive discussion of the case evaluation process, see Donald R.
Philbin, Jr., The One Minute Manager Prepares for Mediation: A
Multidisciplinary Approach to Negotiation Preparation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 249 (2008).
70. See John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of
Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REv. 569, 621
(1989).
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way possible.7'
Beyond superior knowledge, the more experienced
litigator is also more motivated to make the discovery process
crisper, cheaper, and more efficient.7 2  Trials are more
challenging and professionally rewarding than depositions or
document reviews. The travel often associated with discovery
becomes less exciting than it was when the attorney was just
starting out. Clients are more likely to return, and refer
others, to an attorney whom they feel is cost-effective. There
are simply better ways to spend one's time. Discovery
accordingly becomes a necessary evil to the experienced
lawyer, a process to be completed thoroughly but quickly so
the real substance of the case can be addressed.
iii. Cooperation and Professionalism
The third behavioral factor that contributes to controlled
levels of discovery in a case is counsel's willingness to
approach discovery cooperatively, or at least without
aggression. It is true that the adversarial system fosters a
number of cultural conditions and institutional pressures that
work to hinder discovery cooperation.73 Applying equal and
opposite pressure, however, is the self-interest of the parties
to collect and organize information in the most cost-effective
and efficient manner possible.74 Indeed, in a 2009 study of
71. See, e.g., Maura I. Strassberg, Privilege Can Be Abused: Exploring the
Ethical Obligation to Avoid Frivolous Claims of Attorney-Client Privilege, 37
SETON HALL L. REV. 413, 450 (2007).
72. At the 2010 Civil Litigation Conference, Houston attorney Stephen
Susman described a series of pretrial agreements that he tries to reach with
opposing counsel in every case. See Stephen D. Susman, Pretrial Agreements
with Opposing Counsel (unpublished conference material) (on file with author).
As a nod to the wisdom of experience, the first proposed agreement requires the
lead lawyers in the case-not junior associates-to try to resolve every discovery
dispute by telephone. Id.
73. Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique
and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1304 (1978) ('Such factors as
traditional professional loyalties, deeply ingrained lawyering instincts, and
competitive economic pressures assured that the process of gathering and
organizing evidence would not take place in an essentially nonadversarial
context."); see also Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm
Litigators: Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 716-17 (1998)
(noting that in the minds of law firm associates "[tihere was no reward for
cooperative behavior").
74. Paul W. Grimm, Ilan Weinberger & Lisa Yurwit, New Paradigm for
Discovery Practice: Cooperation, 43 MD. B.J. 26, 28 (2010) ("Cooperation
decreases costs by eliminating costs associated with the voluminous filing
166 [Vol. 52
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closed civil cases by the Federal Judicial Center, 63.8% of
plaintiffs' attorneys and 61% of defense attorneys agreed that
the parties in their cases "were able to reduce the cost and
burden [of the named case] of discovery through
cooperation."75 Only 11.3% and 12.3%, respectively, disagreed
with that statement.76 Likewise, at least 95% of respondents
in recent, separate surveys of the American College of Trial
Lawyers, American Bar Association Section of Litigation, and
National Employment Lawyers Association agreed that when
opposing counsel are "collaborative and professional"
throughout the litigation process, the results are less costly to
the client.77
Cooperation may be more common where counsel know
each other (even if they do not like each other), and can also
manifest where the clients know each other. For instance, in
arbitration settings where parties have an existing
relationship, the parties tend to agree to eliminate or reduce
the amount of allowable discovery that will take place.7"
Similarly, repeated interaction between the same lawyers or
law firms on the same type of case cues each side into the
type of information that the other side is likely to seek and
likely to have available. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s
hundreds of cases were filed against manufacturers of the
prescription drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) on behalf of women
who alleged birth defects resulting from their mothers' use of
the drug while pregnant. 79 DES was a generic drug during
submitted to the court in connection with a dispute .... Moreover, cooperation
fosters goodwill and an amicable environment, which could lead to a speedier
resolution-through settlement or otherwise-with lower costs than
antagonistic interactions.").
75. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 18, at 30-31 & fig.17.
76. Id. at 30.
77. See ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION MEMBER
SURVEY: DETAILED REPORT 3 (2009) [hereinafter ABA LITIGATION SECTION
SURVEY] (95% of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing); REBECCA M.
HAMBURG & MATTHEW C. KOSKI, NAT'L EMP'T LAWYERS ASSOC., SUMMARY OF
RESULTS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER SURVEY OF NELA MEMBERS, FALL
2009, 13, 42 (2010) [hereinafter NELA SURVEY] (98% of respondents agreeing or
strongly agreeing).
78. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1,
40 n.186 (2005).
79. See Donald G. Gifford & Paolo Pasicolan, Market Share Liability Beyond
DES Cases: The Solution to the Causation Dilemma in Lead Paint Litigation?,
58 S.C. L. REV. 115, 117 (2006); Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed
Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 967 (1978).
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the time when liability allegedly attached, and many of the
cases turned on the plaintiffs ability to prove that a specific
defendant manufactured the DES allegedly taken by the
plaintiffs mother.8 0 Because the key evidentiary issue was
well known from the outset of the case, attorneys for both the
plaintiffs and the defendant drug manufacturers were able to
tailor discovery to focus on this issue. Even if the first few
cases might have involved some extraneous discovery,
repetition of the same general allegations in many
subsequently filed cases quickly brought the most fruitful and
efficient lines of discovery into focus. Regular interaction
between counsel also reduces the incentive to engage in
abusive practices due to the risk that the opposing attorney
will respond in kind at the next available opportunity. 81
4. Excessive Discovery in the Cultural Model
When the core values of civil litigation are strongly held,
attorneys exercise their discretion to select the forms and
timing of discovery that best promote predictability,
efficiency, and fairness. When those values are not strongly
held, however, attorney behavior is less likely to reflect their
influence. Indeed, the three most commonly observed
behaviors that contribute to concerns about proportionality-
requesting unnecessarily voluminous or redundant discovery,
promulgating overbroad or poorly focused requests, and
refusal to cooperate with opposing counsel-can all be
explained by the erosion or insufficient development of faith
in civil litigation's core values. As explained by the cultural
model, excessive discovery is neither an arbitrary occurrence
nor an inevitable result of unrestrained attorney discretion.
Rather, it is a conspicuous symptom of an attorney's failure to
80. Sheiner, supra note 79, at 972-73. In a handful of states, most notably
California and New York, the courts instead developed a "market share
liability" approach to DES cases, under which liability was apportioned across
all DES manufacturers according to their respective shares of the DES market
at the time liability attached. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.
1980); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989). Most states,
however, retained the traditional requirement that DES plaintiffs identify the
manufacturer whose DES proximately caused their injuries.
81. See Setear, supra note 70, at 617-20 (discussing the additional
incentives to abuse discovery as the size of the bar and individual law firms
grow, and law firms expand to a national practice, as these developments make
sustained interaction with another lawyer less likely).
[Vol. 52
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embrace fully one or more widely held core values.
Consider the overuse of discovery tools. Particularly in
larger law firms, written discovery is left to younger
attorneys with varying levels of guidance from more senior
lawyers. The relative inexperience of newer attorneys is,
unfortunately, often associated with a weaker appreciation of
predictability and efficiency in civil litigation, and a
concomitant aggressiveness in the discovery realm. Junior
attorneys are simply more prone to attack discovery issues
with a combination of professional zeal and professional
ignorance that leads to excess.8 2
The problem is initially one of education. Most law
school courses that touch on civil litigation spend relatively
little time on discovery, 3 even though many new litigators
will work almost exclusively on discovery for months or years
after their initial hire, and even though studies suggest that
up to 90% of a case's costs stem from the discovery process. 4
Instead, coursework dances around the mechanics of
discovery. Civil procedure classes discuss it in future tense
("you will conduct depositions or answer interrogatories")
while evidence and trial advocacy classes discuss it in past
tense ("the following facts and documents came out in
discovery").8 5  Rarely is a law student afforded the
opportunity to contemplate the nature of a specific case, what
facts are needed to prove his or her position(s), and how those
facts might be obtained most efficiently and effectively
through the discovery process. 6 As a result, most young
82. See, e.g., Douglas N. Frenkel et al., Bringing Legal Realism to the Study
of Ethics and Professionalism, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 706 (1998); Roger A.
Hanson & David B. Rottman, United States: So Many States, So Many Reforms,
20 JUST. SYS. J. 121, 125 (1999).
83. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Pretrial Discovery in the Law School
Curriculum: An Analysis and a Suggested Approach, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 401,
401 (1988) ("The topics of pretrial discovery and professional responsibility in
the conduct of discovery are given short shrift in many law school classrooms.");
DAVID I.C. THOMSON, LAW SCHOOL 2.0: LEGAL EDUCATION FOR A DIGITAL AGE
53 (LexisNexis 2010) (discussing how law schools have failed to prepare their
graduates for the skills necessary to conduct electronic discovery).
84. Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and
Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525,
548 tbl.4 (1998).
85. See DAVID I.C. THOMSON, SKILLS & VALUES: DISCOVERY PRACTICE vii
(LexisNexis 2010) (noting that while trial practice classes "no doubt teach useful
and important skills," they do not adequately build discovery skills).
86. Some first-year civil procedure casebooks are doing a better job of
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lawyers are unprepared to undertake the work that, at least
initially, will take up the vast majority of their time. When
they arrive at their new law firms, they are familiar only with
the general mechanics of discovery, not in contemplating its
larger role at trial, or for motion practice or settlement
purposes.88
The lack of a solid educational foundation breeds
conditions for excessive discovery when it combines with the
caution and nervousness of inexperience. It is difficult for a
young lawyer to admit that he or she is not comfortable
thinking through what discovery is needed, and the safe bet
is to be overly aggressive with requests and overly defensive
with responses.8 9 One can much more easily rationalize to a
client or senior partner that one asked for too much, or
offered too little, than the alternative scenario that one gave
up or failed to request the "smoking gun."90 This approach is
often supported, albeit unintentionally, by more experienced
attorney mentors. As one commentator has described:
[Tihe only distinct cultural artifact produced and valued
by litigators is the "war story," an oral epic in which tribal
elders recount, for the edification of junior associates, the
heroic deeds they performed and the smashing victories
they obtained during pretrial discovery in cases which
including practice exercises on the application of discovery devices to specific
fact patterns. See, e.g., STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE:
DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 373, 385-86 (3d ed. Aspen Publishers
2008).
87. See Edward H. Cooper, Discovery Cost Allocation: Comment on Cooter
and Rubinfield, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 465, 466 (1994) ("It seems fair to assert that
much discovery is conducted by people who are not trial litigators. They have
little sense of the realistic needs of trial, nor the manageable possibilities of
trial."). One might also add today that much discovery is conducted by people
with limited sense of the realistic needs for settlement discussions or motion
practice as well.
88. See Frank F. Flegal, Discovery Abuse: Causes, Effects, and Reform, 3
REV. LITIG. 1, 26 (1982).
89. See William T. Gallagher, IP Legal Ethics in the Everyday Practice of
Law: An Empirical Perspective on Patent Litigators, 10 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 309, 363 (2011) (noting in a study of patent attorneys that
"litigators feel pressure to impress senior attorneys with their aggressive
approach to dealing with discovery demands").
90. See id. at 322 (quoting a law firm associate as saying, "if the document's
bad for your case, the last thing you want to do is hand it over to the other side.
So if there's a way... any way of holding it back, you do it. You're not going to
make the partners or clients very happy if you turn it over without a fight"
(ellipsis in original)).
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ultimately were settled .... Younger lawyers, convinced
that their future careers may hinge on how tough they
seem while conducting discovery, may conclude that it is
more important to look and sound ferocious than to act
cooperatively, even if all that huffing and puffing does not
help (and sometimes harms) their cases. 91
It does not follow that every young lawyer will fail to
think about discovery in a meaningful way from the outset of
the case; perhaps those who enter solo practice or seek out a
more experienced and willing mentor in their firms are in a
better position to contemplate exactly what facts should be
ascertained, and how, from the very beginning. Neither does
it follow that every experienced litigator will act thoughtfully
when it comes to discovery. But while individual attorneys
vary in their approach to the right amount of discovery, the
relatively few cases in which discovery spins out of control
suggests that for most experienced attorneys, the knowledge
gained over years of practice provides a relatively clear, if
unstated, guideline.
For some lawyers, regardless of experience, the lure of
hourly billing also erodes faith in core values such as fairness,
efficiency, and predictability. Short of personal ethics or the
demands of a watchful client, there is little to prevent lawyers
who bill by the hour from adopting a leisurely pace: each
additional hour of discovery translates into higher profits for
the firm and higher hours (necessary to reap bonuses) for
associates. 2 Even when a partner writes off some of an
associate's time before billing the client, rarely is the time
discounted for purposes of meeting minimum billable hour
requirements. Law firm associates therefore have a weak
incentive to keep billable hours down. For some less
scrupulous associates, the same system actively encourages
padding billable hours. 3
Overbroad or poorly focused discovery requests are also
explained by the erosion or underdevelopment of an
91. Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discouery Abuse, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1639 (1996) (citations omitted); see also Flegal, supra note
88, at 26; Daniel J. Pope & Helen Whately Pope, "Take Care of Each Other," 63
DEF. COUNS. J. 270, 271 (1996) ("What young lawyers see and hear the most
about today are the litigators who practice 'Rambo law' and 'hardball
discovery.'").
92. See Flegal, supra note 88, at 34-36 (quoting address by Ronald Olsen).
93. See id. at 35-36.
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appropriate emphasis on resolving a case on its individual
merits. One major contributor to this form of erosion is word
processing technology. In developing discovery requests, it
has become all too easy to pull up an existing set of requests
from a previous case of the same type, and loosely tailor it for
the instant litigation. 94 Word processing software allows the
changes (sometimes amounting to no more than substituting
a caption)95 to be made within minutes. Responses are
similarly form in nature. A set of responses to document
requests, for example, might begin with a long set of
impressive but meaningless "General Objections" culled
entirely from a prior document; followed by "specific
objections" to each request that largely mirror the "General
Objections"; and only then by the promise that subject to the
forgoing objections, responsive documents, if any, will be
produced at a later date.96 At no stage in the exchange has
any thought been put into what the case is really about, or
what specific facts are needed to prove a claim or affirmative
defense. 97 Again, while most lawyers will tailor requests to
94. See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84
MINN. L. REV. 505, 534 n.120 (2000) (bemoaning "the 'one-size-fits-all mentality'
often exemplified by word-processor-generated discovery requests ....... );
William W. Kilgarin & Don Jackson, Sanctions for Discovery Abuse Under New
Rule 215, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 767, 810 (1984) ("The main weapon in the attack is
the word processor, which spews out voluminous discovery requests without
regard to relevance or propriety.").
95. See Kilgarin & Jackson, supra note 94.
96. Some courts are finally beginning to clamp down on the "general
objection" phenomenon. See, e.g., Andrew A. Rainer & Janet L. Sanders, New
Standing Order: Hello Standard Definitions, Goodbye General Objections, 53
BOS. B.J., Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 6 (describing a new standing order requiring the
elimination of general objections in cases filed in Massachusetts's Suffolk
Superior Court).
97. One judge directly took on the problem of canned discovery requests in
an era when word processing was still in its infancy, although his words still
ring true today, in SCM Societa Commerciale S.P.A. v. Indus. & Commercial
Research Corp., 72 F.R.D. 110, 113 n.5 (N.D. Tex. 1976) ("I have seen
defendants served with hundreds of irrelevant canned questions that have been
cut and pasted together by a paralegal or other staff assistant. In many cases
the numbers were not consecutive. If the plaintiffs lawyer is not willing to take
the time to prepare questions to fit his case the defendant and his attorney
should not be compelled to answer them. I do not mean that form questions are
per se inappropriate. However, if used at all, the form or canned questions must
be used selectively, must be germane to the case, must be prepared by a lawyer
or under his direction, must be a reasonable number given the nature of the
case, and must be consecutively numbered. If I am convinced that a lawyer has
breached this standard or has in any way acted unreasonably I will deny the
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the needs of the case, technology allows lazy or inexperienced
attorneys to slide by.
Because the sloppiness that contributes to excessive
discovery stems from an insubstantial commitment to civil
litigation's core values rather than a wholesale rejection of
those values, the problem is at least theoretically curable. No
lawyer enters the profession with dreams of cutting and
pasting document requests, or becoming embroiled in a
discovery dispute. Attorneys are pushed that direction by
stress, inexperience, and boredom. Restoring faith in the
values that attract bright attorneys to litigation in the first
place can help control discovery and give greater satisfaction
to attorneys and their clients.
5. Abusive Discovery in the Cultural Model
Like excessive discovery, abusive discovery is associated
with attorney behavior that is uncooperative and poorly
focused on the case's salient issues, as well as discovery
requests that are unnecessarily voluminous, complex, or
burdensome. Also like excessive discovery, the behaviors that
lead to abusive discovery are a reflection of the attorney's
level of faith in his or her culture's core values, brought to life
through the attorney's exercise of discretion. With respect to
those core values, however, there is a critical qualitative
difference. Whereas the excessive discoverer generally
subscribes to the core values of the dominant civil litigation
subculture, albeit in a weakened and erosive fashion, the
abusive discoverer favors an altogether different set of values.
The abusive discoverer, for example, may value the
exploitation of the parties' economic imbalance over
resolution on the merits, psychological intimidation of parties
over litigant participation, or stonewalling over efficiency and
predictability. Inasmuch as they reject or radically
reinterpret the core values of the prevailing civil litigation
culture, abusive discoverers cannot be considered members of
that culture. Rather, they must be viewed as cultural
outliers.
The distinction between excessive discovery and abusive
discovery is important, and suggests different solutions to the
problems of each. Excessive discovery is best addressed by
discovery and/or impose sanctions.").
2012]
HeinOnline  -- 52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 173 2012
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
shoring up faith in civil litigation's core values. Excessive
discoverers share the values of the ordinary civil litigation
culture in a weak or underdeveloped way, and it should
therefore be possible to change their behavior by
strengthening their commitment to those values. The greater
an appreciation an attorney has for values such as access to
justice, fairness, predictability and resolution on the merits,
the more likely he will use his discretion to act in a manner
that promotes those values. Abusive discovery, by contrast, is
best addressed at the level of attorney behavior. Since
abusive discoverers do not subscribe to the core values of the
ordinary civil litigation culture, it is far less likely that they
will respond to efforts to promote those values. Rather, the
behavior that reflects the abusive discoverer's alternate
values must be contained, preferably in a way that does not
simultaneously hinder the typically efficient workings of the
ordinary civil litigation culture.
Regrettably, the current proportionality rules target
neither core values nor attorney behavior, but rather the
exercise of attorney discretion that binds them together. The
results have been bleak. Not only have the current rules
failed to lower instances of excessive and abusive discovery,
but they have also made it more difficult for the vast majority
of attorneys to conduct discovery in line with civil litigation's
core values.
II. THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL RULES AND THE
LITIGATION CULTURE
The cultural model of discovery set forth in Part I posits
that the volume and nature of discovery in civil cases are
controlled primarily by attorneys' fidelity to deeply held core
values. Attorney discretion is the mechanism for converting
this fidelity into concrete behavior. Where faith in the core
values of civil litigation is present, attorneys exercise their
discretion to seek discovery that is narrowly tailored to the
dispute, and otherwise act cooperatively. Where that faith is
lacking, however, the exercise of discretion manifests itself in
the promulgation of disproportionate discovery requests,
noncooperation, and other abusive practices.
Unfortunately, previous efforts to control discovery
through rulemaking have not taken the full cultural model
into account. Rulemakers have simply stopped their analysis
[Vol. 52174
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too soon. In examining cases with disproportionate discovery,
they have correctly recognized a relationship between
uncooperative or inefficient attorney behavior and the
exercise of attorney discretion, but have failed to take the
necessary next step and tie such behavior back to its real
source: the lack of fidelity to the culture's core values. The
product of this view has been a series of civil rules that
specifically restrict the exercise of attorney discretion during
the discovery process. But because attorney discretion is not
the true cause of excessive or abusive discovery, the rules
have proven to be largely ineffective. Moreover, because
attorney discretion is a necessary conduit for attorneys to
express core values, restricting that discretion by rule
actually harms the vast majority of attorneys who rely on
broad discretion to keep discovery efficient, predictable, and
focused.
Once more, the airline analogy may be helpful. Both the
cultural model and the federal rulemaking model would
consider the failure to completely lower a plane's landing gear
to be pilot error-that is, abuse of pilot discretion. But the
cultural model would go farther, associating the error with
the pilot's failure to internalize the "core value" of safe
landings. Based on this conclusion, the cultural model would
call for better pilot training and on-board reminders to pilots
to fully lower the gear. It would, however, leave the actual
process and timing of lowering the landing gear in the hands
of the pilot, because the ultimate goal of landing the plane
safely is maximized when an experienced human pilot is at
the helm, and the exercise of pilot discretion is necessary to
achieve that goal. By contrast, the rulemaking model would
seek to limit the pilot's discretion when coming in for a
landing, perhaps by mandating that an onboard computer
lower the landing gear. This may solve the specific problem
of pilot error, but it could actually increase the risk of an
unsafe landing because it removes the pilot's ability to
substitute her judgment for that of the computer should an
emergency arise as the plane is about to land.
The increased risk of an unfair, inefficient, or
unpredictable pretrial process resulting from the reduction of
attorney discretion parallels the increased risk of unsafe
landings when a computer is substituted for a human pilot in
the lowering of airplane landing gear. In this Part, I examine
2012]
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the history of federal rulemaking with respect to combating
disproportionate discovery, describe how attorney discretion
became the bogeyman for rulemakers, and explain why the
current federal discovery rules unwittingly undermine the
cultural values that ordinarily promote proportional
discovery. This analysis is not meant to criticize the
intentions of the Federal Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
or the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure-who by all measures have recommended the
current rules in good faith and with a great deal of
thoughtfulness-but rather to identify why the rulemaking
measures of the past thirty years have failed to reduce
instances of (and concerns about) disproportionate discovery,
and to set the stage in Part III for a more promising cultural
approach.
A. The Mistaken Emphasis on Attorney Discretion
Attorney behavior is a direct manifestation of civil
litigation's core values, but attorney discretion is not.
Discretion is value-neutral; it is simply the medium through
which values are translated into concrete behavior. Through
the exercise of discretion, an attorney's commitment to values
such as fairness, efficiency and predictability is converted into
focused discovery requests and cooperation with opposing
counsel. Similarly, through the exercise of discretion, an
attorney's weak or faltering commitment to these core values
is converted into behavior that prolongs the discovery process
and increases time, cost, volume, and contentiousness.
Attorney discretion, then, is necessary to give life to the core
values of civil litigation, but discretion itself deserves neither
praise when those values are fostered nor scorn when they
are not.
Unfortunately, for the past thirty years, most
commentators and federal rulemakers have concluded that
attorney discretion is indeed the proper point of focus. One
early commentator summarized the predicament by stating
that abuse of discretion was an unavoidable outgrowth of
client representation:
Like other rational individuals, the attorney employed by
a litigant as his agent presumably attempts to maximize
his own utility. Because an attorney gains some benefits
from discovery that do not accrue to his client, and
[Vol. 52176
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particularly because the attorney incurs few of the costs of
discovery, the litigant's employment of an attorney to
serve as his agent in litigation creates additional
incentives for excessive discovery. 98
Later commentators would make the same point, arguing
that "Id]iscovery use and abuse is . . . bound tightly to the
broad discretion given attorneys during the discovery process
and the powerful client obligation"99 and that "[t]he ultimate
answer to discovery abuse lies in addressing the basic cause:
Absence of judicial oversight has meant that lawyers have the
incentive and opportunity to use the rules for their own
interest rather than to live by the spirit of the rules.""0
To be fair, most commentators and rulemakers did not so
brazenly assert that the exercise of attorney discretion had
failed. But the widespread support in the late 1970s and
early 1980s for increased judicial discretion over the discovery
process sent the identical signal. The balance of attorney
discretion and judicial discretion is essentially a zero-sum
game: either the attorney determines whether and what
discovery should go forward, or the judge does. Efforts to
increase judicial discretion in the discovery realm, then, were
equivalent to efforts to reduce attorney discretion. And once
unleashed, those efforts quickly snowballed. As early as
1976, in the wake of the National Conference on the Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice
(the "Pound Conference"), the American Bar Association
issued a report suggesting that "a prime and personal
responsibility of the trial judge" should be the oversight of the
discovery rules,'1 and that "[discovery] abuse cannot be
eliminated unless the judge insists on defining the issues
before extensive discovery is permitted."'0 2 Wayne Brazil-
then a law professor, later a federal magistrate judge-went
even further in a 1978 article, arguing for at least "sparing[U"
98. Discovery Abuse Under the Federal Rules: Causes and Cures, 92 YALE
L.J. 352, 357-58 (1982) (citations omitted).
99. Jeffrey J. Mayer, Prescribing Cooperation: The Mandatory Pretrial
Disclosure Requirement of Proposed Rules 26 and 37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 12 REV. LITIG. 77, 102 (1992).
100. Nathan M. Crystal, Limitations on Zealous Representation in an
Adversarial System, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 730 (1997).
101. ABA, Report of the Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74 F.R.D.
159, 191 (1976).
102. Id.
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use of a much expanded role for judges in the discovery
process, including the ability of the court to pose its own oral
and written questions to witnesses and parties, request
documents and admissions of fact, and participate directly in
103depositions.
Increased judicial involvement in discovery drew support
from many commentators who had the ears of rulemakers.
Even those who were skeptical of the burdens that greater
judicial discretion would put on individual judges stated that
something had to be done. Frank Flegal and Steven Umin,
respectively a Reporter to and a member of the ABA Section
of Litigation's Special Committee of the Study of Discovery
Abuse, argued in 1981 that:
Abuses of the discovery process will not be brought under
control simply by clarifying the limits of allowable
discovery and requiring sober evaluation of each discovery
request or objection signed by an attorney against those
limits. Judges are needed. They have always been
needed. The important question is when and where to
apply the judicial resource to the best benefit and at an
affordable cost.'
The next year, Judge William Schwartzer-a leading
advocate of increased judicial involvement-argued that the
foundational assumptions of the discovery system, and the
respective roles of attorneys and judges, should be reassessed:
Instead of thinking of discovery as a way for the lawyers
to collect as much information as the judge will permit,
and of pretrial as a separate phase at which some fraction
of that information is organized for use of trial, we should
start thinking from the outset about what sort of case will
be tried and what sort of information will be needed to try
it.
Obviously this is not a self-executing process that can be
left to lawyers. It requires the active involvement of the
judge from the earliest stages of the lawsuit. The judge
will not run the discovery program, but he will be there to
provide guidance and to set limits of time, place, subject
matter, and the like as may be appropriate in light of the
103. Brazil, supra note 73, at 1357.
104. Frank F. Flegal & Steven M. Umin, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil
Litigation: We're Not There Yet, 1981 BYU L. REV. 597, 614 (1981).
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issues, even when the attorneys themselves may not be
inclined to request them. Guidance of the discovery
process will not be supplied, as it is now supplied, by
rulings on discovery disputes. Instead, the judge, in
consultation with the lawyers, will define, both formally
and informally, the scope of the litigation, the issues to be
litigated, and the scope of discovery. 105
By 1983, support for limiting attorney discretion in favor
of judicial discretion coalesced into a new Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). This so-called "proportionality" rule
provided that:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods
set forth in subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if
it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable
from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking
discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the
action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the
discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance
of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act
upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant
to a motion under subdivision (c). 1°6
The Advisory Committee's stated rationale for the new
rule was to "guard against redundant or disproportionate
discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount
of discovery that may be directed to matters that are
otherwise proper subjects of inquiry."1"7 The key was to use
the judge as a discovery gatekeeper. As Arthur Miller, the
Reporter to the Advisory Committee, explained:
There is only one way to reduce redundancy and
disproportionality, and that way is through the federal
judiciary. Nobody would accept a pure dollar test in
determining disproportionality. So it falls to the judge to
limit if you find redundancy, if you find there has been
105. The Judge's Role in Discovery, 3 REV. LITIG. 89, 122-23 (1982)
(comments of William F. Schwartzer) (emphasis added).
106. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) (1983).
107. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, Annotation, Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 90 F.R.D. 451, 481 (1981).
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ample opportunity earlier, or if you find
disproportionality. 0
8
Miller's comments illustrate an important aspect of the
Advisory Committee's thoughts on proportionality. Although
a Special Committee of the American Bar Association had
explicitly acknowledged just three years earlier that in most
cases excessive discovery was not a problem' 09-leading to the
logical inference that disproportionate discovery is capable of
being prevented in most cases by counsel without any court
involvement-suddenly the "only one way to reduce
redundancy and disproportionality [was] through the federal
judiciary."10 Although attorneys had traditionally enjoyed a
great deal of freedom to fashion discovery for their individual
cases, from 1983 onward, whether discovery was proportional
was for a judge to decide.
B. The Practical Limitations of Judicial Discretion
Initially, many commentators joined the chorus of praise
for the judiciary's new discretionary powers. Judge
Schwartzer explained that each judge should apply the
guidance in the new provisions "to promote efficiency and
economy in discovery; he may question and discuss with
counsel whether a deposition is really necessary, whether
there are better ways of obtaining certain information, such
as by voluntary exchange, or whether document production
can be limited or streamlined.""1 The early enthusiasm for
the changes, however, proved to be overstated. The 1983
proportionality provisions (codified today in Rule 26(b)(2)(C))
have not been employed with any real frequency. As one
group of commentators noted, the "paucity of reported cases"
citing to or applying the rule demands the conclusion that
"the amendment itself seems to have created only a ripple in
the caselaw."11 2  Other commentators have offered less
charitable assessments, concluding that Rule 26(b)(2)(C) has
108. ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER
RESPONSIBILITY 32-33 (Federal Judicial Center 1984).
109. ABA Section of Litigation, Annotation, Second Report of the Special
Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse, 92 F.R.D. 137, 139 (1980).
110. MILLER, supra note 108, at 32.
111. The Judge's Role in Discovery, supra note 105, at 123.
112. WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 11, § 2008.1.
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been "ineffective,"113 "seldom used,"114 and "ignored" 15 by the
courts. Even federal judges, the most obvious beneficiaries of
the 1983 proportionality provisions, have acknowledged that
they very rarely invoke Rule 26(b)(2)(C) on their own.116
Professor Miller himself lamented years later that the
provisions have "all been largely ignored.""
17
The provisions of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) failed to gain
widespread currency in large part because they disregard the
importance of attorney discretion in preserving and
promoting civil litigation's core values. To illustrate this
point cleanly, I shall focus on one core value in particular:
procedural predictability. Predictability is at the heart of
civil litigation culture, and its deep interconnection with the
other core values of civil litigation make it representative of
the cultural ethos as a whole."8 Moreover, the importance of
113. Jessica DeBono, Comment, Preventing and Reducing Costs and Burdens
Associated with E-Discovery: The 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 59 MERCER L. REV. 963, 969 (2008).
114. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Civil
Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 349 (2000).
115. Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery
Rules, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 60-61 (2007).
116. See CORINA GERETY, TRIAL BENCH VIEWS: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL
SURVEY ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 31-32 (Institute for the Advancement of the
Legal System 2010) (Nearly sixty percent of federal district and magistrate
judges in a recent survey reported that they "'almost never' invoke Rule
26(b)(2)(C) on their own initiative."). Id. See Ronald J. Hedges, Annotation, A
View from the Bench and the Trenches: A Critical Appraisal of Some Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 227 F.R.D. 123, 127 (2005)
(noting that "the proportionality principle of Rule 26(b)(2) ... is not being used
by judges").
117. Transcript of the "Alumni" Panel on Discovery Reform, supra note 12, at
815.
118. Essential to the rule of law, for example, is the enforcement of
.substantive rights through neutral, predictable, and largely transparent
procedures .... " Wayne D. Brazil, Rights and Resolution in Mediation: Our
Responsibility to Debate the Reach of Our Responsibility, DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MAGAZINE, Summer 2010 at 9. Similarly, an essential dimension of access to
justice is relative certainty regarding the costs (and time and money) that a
litigant is expected to incur; without this certainty, a litigant may be afraid to
proceed to a judicially sponsored resolution. See, e.g., Chris Tollefson, Costs and
the Public Interest Litigant: Okanagan Indian Band and Beyond, 19 CAN. J.
ADMIN. L. & PRAC. 39, 60 (2006) (noting the importance of knowing potential
cost liability at an early stage of public interest litigation). Fair notice, too,
relies on a predictable process: one commentator has referred to notice and
predictability as "two interrelated values." David L. Shapiro, Continuity and
Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 943 (1992). Put
simply, each of these values requires predictability to reach its full expression.
Access to justice, notice, or the rule of law which is not predictable is nothing at
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predictability in the context of litigation has long been
recognized. Jurists as philosophically disparate as Judge
Jerome Frank119  and Justice Antonin Scalia 120  have
emphasized the value of predictability to attorneys-both in
counseling their clients as to the line between lawful and
unlawful behavior, and in educating clients about what to
expect during the litigation process. Like many professionals,
attorneys are valued in society in large part for their ability
to anticipate certain processes and outcomes with reasonable
accuracy. Put more bluntly, no one would hire a lawyer who
confessed that he had no idea how the case might proceed or
what the final result will likely be.'2 '
When compared to the normally stabilizing role of
attorney discretion in the realm of pretrial discovery, the
judicial discretion envisioned by Rule 26(b)(2)(C) upsets
predictability in three different ways. The first problem is
one of strategic uncertainty: should a conscientious attorney
even risk raising a proportionality issue with the court? It is
no secret that judges greatly dislike proportionality disputes
(and discovery disputes generally). They can be time
consuming, especially if many requests must be individually
reviewed, and resolving them may naturally feel less pressing
to a judge than her criminal docket or the resolution of
dispositive civil motions.122  District judges may try to
alleviate some of the burden by assigning discovery disputes
to magistrate judges, but the time that must be spent sorting
all. Id.
119. See Jerome Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 646
(1931). Judge Frank, of course, was an intellectual leader of the Legal Realist
movement and a chief progenitor of the idea that judicial decisions were not
straightforward or predictable in many cases, but the fundamental point that
attorneys highly value predictability remains a baseline of his argument.
120. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175, 1179 (1989).
121. Jonathan Molot illustrates this point with a useful example of a one-
time plaintiff consulting his or her lawyer about the likelihood of success at
trial. See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a
Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 69-70 (2010). The lawyer counsels the
client to build expectations about the damage award based not on the highest
possible amount but rather on a review of similarly-situated cases. Id.
122. See, e.g., Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse Revisited: Some Specific
Proposals to Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 189,
203 (1992) (noting impact of criminal docket and Speedy Trial Act on a judge's
ability to turn attention to managing civil discovery); Gordon, supra note 73, at
720.
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through the efficacy of discovery requests takes away from
their equally important tasks, such as mediation of civil
cases.123 Further, judges commonly express frustration that
the parties cannot resolve discovery issues on their own. 24
An attorney might therefore decline to raise a proportionality
issue with the court, although warranted, if doing so risks
damaging the attorney's long-term credibility with the judge.
A second problem is that even if a judge is willing and
able to take on a proportionality dispute, an unavoidable
information gap hampers the predictability of his decision.
Even the most thoughtful and well-meaning judge does not
have as much information as the parties and their counsel on
the particular importance of a piece of requested discovery." 5
Attorneys have the relative luxury of being more familiar
with the facts and strategy of a case than the judge, and are
privy to work product and confidential client information that
typically would not be shared with the court. 126 Inasmuch as
a judge is almost always working with less information than
counsel, an attorney's ability to predict the outcome of the
judge's proportionality determination may suffer.
Beyond strategic uncertainty and the judicial information
gap, there is a third problem: the structure of the
proportionality rule itself contributes to unpredictability in
the judge's ultimate ruling. The proportionality test in Rule
123. See Patrick E. Longan, Bureaucratic Justice Meets ADR: The Emerging
Role for Magistrates as Mediators, 73 NEB. L. REV. 712, 751 (1994) (suggesting
that magistrate judges might have more time for mediation if initial disclosures
helped alleviate discovery disputes).
124. See, e.g., Stephen G. Easton & Franklin D. Romines II, Dealing with
Draft Dodgers: Automatic Production of Drafts of Expert Witness Reports, 22
REV. LITIG. 355, 394 n.163 (2003); Furgeson, supra note 60, at 821 (confessing
that early in his judicial tenure, "[elvery time lawyers came before me with a
discovery dispute, no matter how legitimate and no matter how hard they had
worked to resolve it, I barked at them for bothering me. I treated each and
every disagreement as a big pain in my backside."). See, e.g., The Judge's Role
in Discovery, supra note 105, at 139 (comments of Jerold Solovy) (noting that
the attorney who raises a discovery issue "will not receive a friendly welcome
from the court because the court does not really want to be bothered").
125. See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural
Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1990-93 (2007); Ronald J. Allen and Alan
E. Guy, Conley as a Special Case of Twombly and Iqbal: Exploring the
Intersection of Evidence and Procedure and the Nature of Rules, 115 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 1, 29 (2011) ("It is hard to imagine anyone more informed about the
risks and costs of error, the ease of investigation, and the policies at stake than
the parties ... ").
126. See Bone, supra note 125, at 1990.
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26(b)(2)(C)(iii) offers up five different factors for judicial
consideration--"the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the
issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the
proposed discovery in resolving the issues"127-without any
explicit guidance as to whether or how those factors should be
evaluated or weighted. 12 8 On top of this, various other
discovery rules and related Advisory Committee notes have
subsequently introduced their own factors for consideration
when determining whether permissible discovery should be
expanded or shrunken back.'29 These changes gave judges
the ability to tailor discovery to individual cases, but
simultaneously eroded the parties' ability to predict ahead of
time the amount and volume of discovery that would be
allowed. 3 ° With such little guidance, judges asked to make
proportionality decisions are essentially engaging in
improvisation. Even if each decision is the product of careful
consideration, its predictive value for future decisions is
suspect at best.'3 '
Given the complexity of Rule 26(b)(2)(C), it is perhaps
unsurprising that many judges have condensed the
proportionality factors into a more straightforward, albeit
equally unpredictable, weighing of benefits and burdens. At a
conference in 1982 to discuss the proposed new
proportionality provision, several judges "indicated that they
had already been applying a rough sort of cost-benefit
analysis to discovery requests." 32 It appears that even after
127. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)(iii) (1983).
128. Robert Bone makes this point more generally with respect to many of
the Federal Rules. See Bone, supra note 125, at 1969; see also The Judge's Role
in Discovery, supra note 105, at 184 (comment of Charles Halpern).
129. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee's note, 2000 Amend. (d)
(listing a "variety of factors" that the court "might consider" in determining
whether to extend the time for a deposition).
130. This same' fate has befallen other multi-factor tests in the realm of
discovery. See, e.g., Note, Protection of Opinion Work Product Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 VA. L. REV. 333, 344-45 (1978) (noting that
the balancing approach made it difficult for attorneys to predict outcomes of
work product controversies).
131. See, e.g., Remarks of The Honorable Craig Shaffer at Colorado Bar
Association Intellectual Property Institute in Denver, CO, (May 29, 2009) (CD-
ROM containing remarks on file with author).
132. The Judge's Role in Discovery, supra note 105, at 103; see also Richard
L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 773 (1998) ("The
concept of proportionality was already intrinsic to Rule 26 before 1983.").
184 [Vol. 52
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the new factors for consideration-amount in controversy
among them-were introduced in 1983, most proportionality
analyses continued to follow the rather mechanistic balancing
of perceived benefits and burdens. Indeed, many discovery
opinions have simply collapsed the explicit proportionality
factors into the question of "whether the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit"-without
analysis or even recognition of the specific factors. 33 Perhaps
the benefit/burden test feels more comfortable to the
judiciary, and more in step with the traditional role of the
judge as removed from the details of the case until trial, or at
least summary judgment. The more complex balancing test
introduced in 1983, by contrast, was conspicuously tied to a
more active (and perhaps less comfortable) judicial role, and
was accordingly neglected. 134
The unpredictability of individualized proportionality
determinations has real consequences for parties and counsel.
One judge's consideration of the need for ten additional
interrogatories may yield a result quite different from
another judge's consideration of the same question.'35
Moreover, judicial determinations at the discovery stage will
impact the parties' decision-making with respect to summary
judgment, trial, and settlement negotiations going forward,
and the judge must account for these effects as well. 136  Of
course, there is little appellate guidance since so much falls
within the realm of judicial discretion. As a result, both
parties and judges may find themselves wondering what will
be the next step. One attorney summed up the situation by
arguing that discovery "rules don't help because trial courts
operate with almost unfettered discretion and appeals are
133. For some recent examples of this common trend, see, for example,
Netbula, LLC v. Chordiant Software, Inc., No. C08-00019 JW (HRL), 2009 WL
3352588, *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2009); Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevators
Ams. Corp., 662 F. Supp.2d 375, 379-81 (D. Del. 2009); Bennett v. Kingsbridge
Heights Rehabilitation Care Center, No. 07 Civ. 9456(LAK), 2009 WL 3294301,
*3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2009); Thompson v. Lantz, No. 3:04cv2084 (AWT), 2009
WL 3157561, *2 (D. Conn. Sep. 25, 2009).
134. See Transcript of the "Alumni" Panel on Discovery Reform, supra note
12, at 828 (quoting Arthur Miller) ("[Judicial case] management as a matter of
doctrine was not recognized in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure until 1983
when Rule 16 was amended... and said to the district judges, 'management is
part of your job description.'" ).
135. See, e.g., The Judge's Role in Discovery, supra note 105, at 103.
136. See Bone, supra note 125, at 1979-80.
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almost nonexistent .... ,,13' As a result, "[1]itigators cannot
predict how a court will treat discovery. No uniformity exists
between courts or even within a particular district among the
judges, and the trial courts receive no guidance from the
courts of appeal on how to deal with discovery issues."138
Ultimately, using a judge to control discovery on a case-
by-case basis is a clumsy approach. No matter how talented
the judge, determinations about the proper use of discovery
and specific discovery tools in any particular case are better
left to the attorneys on the case, who are more familiar with
the facts and needs of the case, and who are directly
responsible to their clients.139 There is too much the judge
never knows about the case that impacts discovery
decisions-including investigations that appeared fruitful but
later dried up, information subject to the attorney-client
privilege, and counsel's litigation strategies. 140 Further, even
if attorneys were not clearly the best focal point for using and
controlling discovery, the exercise of judicial discretion to
monitor and control individual discovery requests is not a
particularly good use of judicial energy.14 '
The dilemmas posed by direct judicial involvement in
discovery have proven too much even for some judges. At the
National Conference on Discovery Reform in 1982, Judge
Walter Jay Skinner commented:
As to the new role of the judge in discovery, some doubt
has been expressed as to whether the judges will be able
to do a good job in fine-tuning the discovery. In my view,
it is perfectly clear that they will not. There is no way
that a judge can take a file with three folders and a set of
interrogatories numbering 367 and in any practical way
determine which of those 367 interrogatories are
appropriate for all the materials in those three folders. As
137. Alan F. Blakley, Practice and Procedure: Everyone Hates Discovery, 52
FED. LAw. 10, 10 (2005).
138. Id.
139. Setear, supra note 70, at 626-27. Attorneys may from time to time
embrace discovery limits to give them protection against malpractice claims by
overzealous clients who assert that not enough discovery was conducted, see, for
example, Praxair, Inc. v. Hinshaw & Culbertson, No. 97 C 3079, 2000 WL
283968, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2000), but even then limits are better set at
the beginning of the case rather than as part of a review of individual requests
under Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
140. See Bone, supra note 125, at 1990; Allen & Guy, supra note 125, at 29.
141. See Bone, supra note 125, at 1990-95.
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a result, when the judge becomes involved in that aspect
of discovery, the results will probably be rather crude and
not as good as the lawyers could do themselves.
142
Even Judge Schwartzer, a leading advocate of discovery
reform and judicial involvement in limiting discovery,
expressed concerns about whether judges should be
substituting their judgment for that of trial counsel: "Who,
after all, is running the case? Who has the responsibility for
the client's welfare, and who must shoulder the blame for
defeat?" 43
Beyond the difficult application of the rule, the 1983
amendments to Rule 26(b) continue to hamper procedural
predictability because they do not require, or even necessarily
encourage, courts and parties to think about proportionality
in a comprehensive way. As discussed above, attorney fealty
to predictability in the ordinary civil litigation culture
typically manifests itself in comprehensive thinking about the
case's specific discovery needs from an early stage of the
litigation, as well as consulting lessons drawn from past
experience with similar case types. These behaviors treat
individual discovery requests as part of a larger enterprise in
the collection of potentially useful evidence. The language of
the Rule 26(b)(2)(C) proportionality test, however, invited
courts to focus instead on discrete discovery requests, by
considering whether specific, disputed discovery tools,
presented individually, were disproportionate for a case.
Many courts took that invitation.'" Nothing in the rule
specifically requires a judge to think about the case as a
whole in making his or her determination, and nothing in
those provisions explicitly suggests that the same broad
thinking should be required of the parties. This is a notable
and rather stunning omission given that the proportionality
provisions were inserted at the same time that the initial
pretrial conference was given an expanded role in mapping
out discovery in a case.'45 Some judges have used the
142. The Judge's Role in Discovery, supra note 105, at 195-96.
143. Id. at 120.
144. See, e.g., New River Dry Dock, Inc. v. Falls at Marina Bay, L.P., No. 08-
60216-CIV, 2008 WL 2620727, *5-11 (S.D. Fla. Jun. 30, 2008) (reciting the
language of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) before walking through an analysis of individual
interrogatories).
145. See FED. R. CiV. P. 16(b) (1983).
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proportionality provisions to develop an early framework at
the initial pretrial conference for guiding discovery
generally, 146  but Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) itself primarily
contemplates that the balancing test will be conducted in
response to a motion by the parties during the discovery
phase.
With so many practical weaknesses, the promise of the
1983 amendments had dimmed by the end of the 1980s, and
grumbling about disproportionate discovery returned. One
commentator noted that the judges' perceptions of their role
in controlling discovery were very different from the original
assumptions and wishes of the Advisory Committee when it
came to working to keep discovery proportional: "[L] awyers do
not do it, . . . [district] judges cannot do it, and magistrates
hate to do it. So nobody is doing it."'47  On the fiftieth
anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, one
attorney lamented that Rule 26(b)(2)(C) was "an extremely
valuable suggestion to the courts, but it has proved too subtle
to do the job. The scalpel having been attempted
unsuccessfully, it is now time for the axe." 48
C. The Chasm Between Rule-Based Limits and Cultural
Values
1. Presumptive Limits on Discovery Tools
Perhaps because the expansion of judicial discretion did
not provide the promised remedy for disproportionate
discovery, additional restrictions on attorney discretion
followed the 1983 amendments. In 1993, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were amended to impose presumptive limits
on the use of interrogatories (25 per party)149 and depositions
(10 per side). 150 After an initial period during which district
146. See Transcript of "Alumni" Panel on Discovery Reform, supra note 12, at
834 (comments of Wayne Brazil).
147. The Judge's Role in Discovery, supra note 105, at 200 (comment of
Steven Umin). But see Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure to How
Lawyers Litigate: 'Twixt the Cup and the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227, 234-35
(2010) (suggesting that the ineffectiveness of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) was due to "the
habits of party management [which] proved resistant to the encouragement of
judicial control").
148. John P. Frank, The Rules of Civil Procedure-Agenda for Reform, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1883, 1891 (1989).
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1) (1993).
150. FED. R. CIv. P. 30(a)(2) (1993).
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courts could opt out of the limitation requirements, the
presumptive limits on interrogatories and depositions were
made mandatory in 2000, at which time rulemakers also
imposed a presumptive time limit of seven hours per
deposition.151
Contemporaneous commentary offers two justifications
for these presumptive limits. First, commentators argued
that such limits would gently constrain the parties and keep
them focused on the most important issues in the case. As
Stephen Subrin argued:
[Numeric limits] force lawyers . . . to focus their attention
on the facts supporting the elements of the strongest
causes of action and elements of the most promising
defenses. Numeric limits and limits of time also provide
constraint on the process without ordinarily requiring the
delay, expense, and court time required to resolve disputes
over such concepts as "what is a fact" (as opposed to
evidence or conclusions) and whether "facts" have been
sufficiently pleaded.5 2
As a second justification, the Advisory Committee noted
that if the presumptive limits did not automatically invoke an
issue-narrowing process, the judge would be in a clear
position to limit interrogatories and depositions under the
Rule 26(b)(2) proportionality test.15 Collectively, then, the
presumptive limits were intended to prevent runaway
discovery by explicitly flagging the danger of extraneous
discovery for both the parties and the court.
Unfortunately, like Rule 26(b)(2)(C), presumptive limits
have had only a nominal impact on preventing excessive or
abusive discovery. Although the limits purport to educate
attorneys about useful, focused discovery behavior, nowhere
do they explicitly connect that behavior to the core values
that ordinarily foster it. Presumptive limits merely set an
arbitrary cap on depositions and interrogatories without
inculcating the values that make that cap meaningful. They
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d).
152. Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of
a Sound Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV.
79, 95 (1997); see also Carol Rice Andrews, Thinking About Civil Discovery in
Alabama: Using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Thinking Tool, 60
ALA. L. REV. 683, 688-90 (2009).
153. FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee's note, 1993 Amend. (a); FED. R.
Civ. P. 33 advisory committee's note, 1993 Amend. (a).
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arguably even undermine those values. As one commentator
noted, "[bly making the process of acquiring information from
other parties more difficult and costly, [interrogatory limits]
restrict even further the flow of information to the trier of
fact,... increase the probability of surprise at trial, and ...
reduce the likelihood of fair judgments and settlements."154
In practice, presumptive limits also have the dubious
distinction of constraining conscientious attorneys while
providing virtually no meaningful restraint on would-be
discovery abusers. From the perspective of an attorney who
has internalized civil litigation's core values, presumptive
limits are an inconvenience. In the rare case in which the
attorney determines that an investigation legitimately
warrants more than ten depositions or twenty-five
interrogatories, she must seek approval from the court or
opposing counsel, justifying the need without divulging client
secrets or case strategy. Of course, seeking recourse to the
court under Rule 26(b)(2)(C) raises the ongoing specter of
unpredictability, and further undermines a key core value.
At the same time, those who do not fully embrace civil
litigation's core values easily sidestep the rule-based
discovery caps. First, because presumptive limits only set a
ceiling on the use of interrogatories and depositions, it is easy
enough for an enterprising discovery abuser to employ other
discovery tools that are not similarly restricted. In fact,
courts themselves have on occasion encouraged parties to
move on to another discovery tool once presumptive limits
have been reached. 155 Further, while presumptive limits on
interrogatories and depositions may have made more sense in
the 1980s and 1990s, when those discovery tools were
significant contributors to cost and delay, they are much less
powerful tools in this era, where the bulk of time and cost in a
complex case might stem from the restoration, review and
production of electronically stored information.156 Indeed,
154. Brazil, supra note 73, at 1336.
155. E.g., Medcorp., Inc. v. Pinpoint Techs., Inc., No. 08-cv-00867-MSK-KLM,
2008 WL 5226387, *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 12, 2008); New Colt Holding Corp. v. RJG
Holdings of Fla., Inc., No. Civ. 3:02cv173 (PCD), 2003 WL 22305141, *2 (D.
Conn. Feb. 6, 2003).
156. See INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: A VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES 5 (2008)
(noting that "the costs of processing, reviewing, culling and producing 1 GB of
data [are generally] between $5,000 and $7,000"-meaning the typical "midsize
[Vol. 52
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now that Rule 33(d) permits a party responding to
interrogatories to refer to documents in lieu of a separate
answer, interrogatories have declined in relative value, while
the discovery of documents and electronically stored
information under Rule 34 has taken on even more
importance.' 57
A second problem is that both the rules implementing
discovery tool limits 5 8 and advocates of such limits5 9 stress
that the limits must be presumptive only, and the Advisory
Committee seems to have struggled with how seriously the
presumption should be taken. The Committee noted, for
example, that "[t]he presumptive duration [of a deposition]
may be extended, or otherwise altered, by agreement" 6 ' and
that "[i]t is expected that in most instances the parties and
the witness will make reasonable accommodations to avoid
the need for resort to the court."'61 Some courts have even
questioned whether the presumptive limits should be followed
at all. In one recent case, the court openly chided a party for
holding firm to the seven-hour limit in Rule 30(d) before
granting a second day of deposition for a witness. 6
Party accommodation in these circumstances would make
sense if it really prevented the need for a resort to the court.
In practice, however, disputes over interrogatory and
deposition limits do arise, leaving the judge with a distasteful
choice: either exercise her discretion and undertake a full
proportionality review to determine whether additional
case" with 500 GB of data would posit $2.5 to $3.5 million in e-discovery costs).
157. See Amy Luria and John E. Clabby, An Expense Out of Control: Rule 33
Interrogatories After the Advent of Initial Disclosures and Two Proposals for
Change, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 29 (2005).
158. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
159. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51,
64 (1997); Subrin, supra note 152, at 97.
160. FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee's note, 2000 Amend. (d).
161. Id. Similar commentary governs the Advisory Committee's notes on
presumptive limits on interrogatories. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33 advisory
committee's note, 1993 Amend.(a) ("As with the number of depositions
authorized by Rule 30, leave to serve additional interrogatories is to be allowed
when consistent with Rule 26(b)(2).").
162. See Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Storage, Inc., No. 06-C-462-C, 2007 WL
5404935, *2 (W.D. Wis. Jun. 1, 2007) ("[T]he attorneys just don't get it. It is
incomprehensible to this court that the plaintiff in a multinational high-tech
patent lawsuit flat-out refused to make one of its pivotal experts available for
more than seven hours of deposition based solely on the presumptive limit of
Rule 30(d).").
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depositions or interrogatories should be allowed (which may
require a detailed analysis of the value of both the discovery
that has already been taken and each new proposed
interrogatory 163 or deposition 164) or effectively forfeit her
discretion by granting or denying the additional discovery
without a detailed review. The first option requires the judge
to be familiar not only with the facts of the case, but with the
details of the requesting party's strategy, a task which falls
somewhere between the impractical and the impossible. The
second option renders judicial control virtually meaningless,
relegating it to nothing more than an inconvenient hurdle for
the requesting party.
Ultimately, the limits on interrogatories and depositions
are at once under- and over- inclusive, 165 establishing
frustrating obstacles for the majority of attorneys already
dedicated to civil litigation's core values, and offering no
substantial hurdles to the minority of attorneys who have not
internalized those values. In this respect, they represent no
meaningful advance over the flawed application of Rule
26(b)(2)(C).
2. Mandatory Initial Disclosures
Marching in temporal lockstep with presumptive
discovery limits is another, more modest, restriction, on
attorney discretion: the requirement that parties in most civil
cases exchange certain "initial disclosures" at or within
fourteen days after the parties' Rule 26(f) discovery
conference. 66 Like other limits on attorney discretion, initial
disclosures had their intellectual genesis in the late 1970s. 67
They too spent a decade on the back burner before being
introduced into Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) in
1993.168 After several years as an optional requirement,
initial disclosures were made mandatory in all federal district
163. E.g., Masters v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. C07-03792 JW (HRL), 2008
WL 2397461 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 11, 2008).
164. E.g., Barrow v. Greenville Ind. Sch. Dist., 202 F.R.D. 480, 481 (N.D. Tex.
2001).
165. See Bone, supra note 125, at 2009.
166. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1)(C).
167. See Angela R. Lang, Note, Mandatory Disclosure Can Improve the
Discovery System, 70 IND. L.J. 657, 657-58 (1995).
168. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (1993).
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courts in 2000.169 While not as overtly restrictive as Rule
26(b)(2)(C) or presumptive limits, mandatory initial
disclosures nonetheless constrain attorney discretion by
requiring the exchange of certain information even though
the timing, content, or form of that exchange might not be
maximally beneficial to counsel and the parties.
Like presumptive limits, initial disclosures were
introduced with the good faith intention of encouraging the
type of attorney behavior that normally leads to proportional
discovery. Two of the earliest and strongest proponents of
mandatory initial disclosure, Wayne Brazil and Judge
William Schwartzer, advocated for the practice as part of
creating a "fundamental shift" in the adversarial nature of
discovery. 170 One commentator later observed, "it is clear that
their ultimate objective was to completely overturn the
adversary relationship during the pretrial stage,
transforming the process into a cooperative, truth-seeking
relationship between the plaintiff, the defendant, and the
court."17' Judge Schwartzer himself expressed the hope that
initial disclosures would "reduce the burdensome and
unproductive adversariness that now often characterizes
discovery."172  Initial disclosures were also intended to
promote issue-narrowing behavior by providing early
information to each party that otherwise would have to be
uncovered through other discovery tools. 17 3  Proponents
expected that "unambiguous disclosure requirements[]
[would] surely decrease the need for judicial oversight"174 and
would "enable parties to target discovery more effectively." 175
Unfortunately, initial disclosures have been as ineffective
as presumptive limits and judicial discretion in lowering the
instances and effects of disproportionate discovery. In a
Federal Judicial Center survey of attorneys in 1997, nearly
169. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (2000).
170. Kuo-Chang Huang, Mandatory Disclosure: A Controversial Device With
No Effects, 21 PACE L. REV. 203, 209 (2000).
171. Id. at 212.
172. William Schwartzer, New Discoveries for the Discovery Process, LEGAL
TIMEs, Nov. 25, 1991, at 25.
173. See Meade W. Mitchell, Comment, Discovery Abuse and a Proposed
Reform: Mandatory Disclosure, 62 MISS. L.J. 743, 762-63 (1993).
174. Id. at 764.
175. Lawrence M. Frankel, Disclosure in the Federal Courts: A Cure for
Discovery Ills?, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 249, 271 (1993); Schwartzer, supra note 171, at
25.
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half the respondents indicated that initial disclosures had no
effect on overall litigation expenses or the amount of
discovery in their cases. 176  Further, sixty-two percent of
respondents felt that initial disclosures had no effect on the
number of discovery disputes.'77 A Rand Corporation study
published in 1998, and reviewing cases filed during a
"comparison district" period in 1992-1993,178 concluded that
there was generally "no significant statistical difference in
attorney work hours between cases where early disclosures
were" mandated and those with no such requirement.'79 This
conclusion held regardless of case type or complexity, and
regardless of whether total attorney work hours, or work
hours dedicated solely to discovery, were measured. 8 0  An
independent study in 2000 similarly found that initial
disclosures had no significant effect on a case's time to
disposition'8 ' or trial rate. 82 Moreover, attorneys on both
sides of the "v." have expressed their belief that the system
does not work. Recent surveys suggest that only about one-
third of lawyers with federal practice experience, whether
self-identifying as primarily representing plaintiffs, primarily
representing defendants, or representing a mix of clients, feel
that Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures work well. 183
Viewed through a cultural lens, it is not hard to see why
initial disclosures have not met the high hopes of their
progenitors. Disclosures were intended to focus attorneys on
narrowing disputed issues and encouraging cooperation-
behaviors well in line with the civil litigation's core values.
176. WILLGING ETAL., supra note 18, at 26 tbl.17.
177. Id.
178. JAMES K. KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS 27 (RAND 1996). As part of
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Congress designated ten "pilot" district
courts and ten "comparison" district courts. Id. Pilot districts were required to
develop cost and delay reduction plans that adopted six case management
principles set forth in the Act, while comparison districts were unrestricted as
long as some kind of plan was developed. Id.
179. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT: FURTHER
ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA 48 (RAND
1998).
180. See id. at 48-50.
181. Huang, supra note 170, at 248-55.
182. Id. at 257-62.
183. See ABA LITIGATION SECTION SURVEY, supra note 77, at 55-59;
ACTL/lAALS INTERIM REPORT, supra note 15, at A-3; NELA SURVEY, supra
note 77, at 15.
[Vol. 52
HeinOnline  -- 52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 194 2012
PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY
However, nothing in the text of Rule 26(a)(1) or the actual
practice of exchanging initial disclosures directly promotes
those values. Accordingly, attorneys can go through the
motions of exchanging initial disclosures without gaining any
appreciation for the values they represent. Ultimately,
attorneys prone to either excessive or abusive discovery can
fully satisfy the strictures of Rule 26(a)(1) without increasing
the likelihood of cooperation or comprehensive discovery
thinking as the discovery process moves forward. Like a
criminal who says "please" and "thank you" while robbing a
store at gunpoint, an abusive attorney can follow the
standards of politesse in Rule 26(a)(1) while mocking the
mores from which those standards arise.
Even worse, mandatory initial disclosures may
unintentionally undermine the core values of efficiency and
predictability by discouraging early comprehensive thinking
about discovery. The demand for transsubstantivity creates
the lowest common denominator of initial disclosures: the
rules only require the production of information that is likely
to be available in every case, regardless of its nature or
complexity. But for complex cases-the very cases in which
excessive or abusive discovery are particularly feared-Rule
26(a)(1)'s categories of mandated information are woefully
underinclusive. Under a plain reading of the rule, a plaintiff
in a patent infringement case would not have to turn over the
patent's prosecution history, and a plaintiff in a personal
injury case would not have to disclose her medical records,
even though in both case types such information is typically
central to the case, and in any event will be among the first
documents requested by the opposing party. In other words,
significant additional discovery is still necessary because Rule
26(a)(1) does not mandate disclosure of the full range of
expected, relevant information. At the same time, mandatory
initial disclosures can be overinclusive-because many cases
need little or no discovery, yet the parties will still face the
imposition of time and cost to meet the requirements of Rule
26(a)(1)."s  Our transsubstantive approach compares
unfavorably to that of the United Kingdom, where "pre-action
protocols" have been developed for each practice area that
specify the detailed information unique to the case type that
184. See Huang, supra note 170, at 221.
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must be voluntarily exchanged by the parties. 85
Ultimately, all attempts to create "proportional"
discovery by rule over the past three decades have struggled
because they do not directly implicate the core values of civil
litigation culture. A better regime would promote those core
values, both by reminding attorneys directly about the
importance of those values, and by supporting and reinforcing
the forms of attorney behavior that reflect those values. Such
a regime would also recognize the essential importance of
attorney discretion as a means of realizing a fair, efficient,
and predictable process. The systemic response to attorneys
prone to disproportionate discovery should not be to remove
or reduce their discretion, but rather to guide that discretion
back toward the realization of prevailing cultural values. The
next Part offers a preliminary sketch of a possible guided
attorney discretion regime.
III. RECLAIMING AND REINFORCING GUIDED ATTORNEY
DISCRETION
A. Rules and Culture in Conversation
The current rule-based limitations on the use of discovery
tools unintentionally undermine the core values of the civil
litigation culture by removing ordinary norms of guided
attorney discretion and replacing them with fixed rules and
judicial discretion. It is therefore unsurprising that the
current rules are largely disliked and underutilized in
practice. This does not mean, however, that there is no place
at all for rules, formal procedures, or even (limited) judicial
discretion in the discovery process. Rather, whatever rules,
procedures and discretion are employed must be consistent
with the prevailing civil litigation culture, and should
reinforce cultural norms and core values at every opportunity.
This conclusion may be controversial to some. Thomas
Main, for example, has openly fretted about the
"overwhelming" nature of the problem that the cultural
185. See, e.g., Pre-Action Protocol for Personal Injury Claims, MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE, app. B (Apr. 2007) (setting out "standard disclosure lists" for personal
injury cases), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://
www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules-fin/contents/protocols/protLpic.htm#IDA230E
C. All of the current UK pre-action protocols may be accessed at http://www.
justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules-fin/menus/protocol.htm.
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approach poses for proceduralists:
If we acknowledge the influence of non-formal rules of
procedure, apparently we must develop a culture that
nurtures the environment and all of its attendant non-
formal factors so that the rule is more likely to be
"followed." Hence, the overwhelming question is whether
to engage in a relationship with a field of procedure that
transcends the superficial. I am not sure that I want to. I
am not sure that I can. I am not sure whether I must.1
8 6
Notwithstanding this candid reluctance, rulemakers and
scholars alike are no doubt obligated, at minimum, to
understand the impact of cultural currents on the application
of procedural rules. Indeed, the current proportionality rules
are a textbook example of a regime whose failure to
"transcend the superficial"18 7 has resulted in a system that is
frequently ineffective and largely ignored.
The cultural model suggests a better approach. First, it
is important to develop a variety of solutions tailored to the
different causes of disproportionate discovery. Excessive
discovery is caused by the erosion or underdevelopment of the
core values of the ordinary civil litigation culture, and is best
addressed by developing rules and procedures that renew and
strengthen faith in those values. This renewal can be
accomplished in part by directly educating attorneys about
the importance of the core values and by promoting the
attorney behaviors that naturally flow from these values,
such as cooperation, learning from experience, and
comprehensive thinking about the case's discovery needs.
The combination of directly emphasizing core values and
habituating attorneys to behaviors that reflect these values
stems from the cultural model's conclusion that excessive
discovery is merely a straying from previously embraced core
values, and is essentially curable through proper guidance.
The same cannot be said for grossly excessive or abusive
discovery, which require a more heavy-handed approach.
Grossly excessive discovery reflects an extraordinary erosion
of an attorney's faith in civil litigation's core values, an
erosion that may not be cured easily through education or
behavioral guidance. Abusive discovery reflects a strong
186. Thomas 0. Main, "An Overwhelming Question" About Non-Formal
Procedure, 3 NEV. L.J. 388, 399 (2003).
187. Id.
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affinity for an altogether different, more malevolent, set of
core values, and may be similarly resistant to gentle efforts to
refresh attorneys' familiarity with the prevailing culture's
core values. Perhaps some abusive discoverers might be
persuaded to change their worldview through programs that
emphasize values such as resolution on the merits, fairness,
and predictability, but this is unlikely to work with
everyone-any more than programs to emphasize the
existence of a single deity would be effective in converting all
polytheists to a monotheistic culture. Instead, preventative
measures must be taken to dilute or eliminate the impact of
the abusive discoverer's behavior during the pretrial process.
In addition, any cultural solution to disproportionate
discovery must preserve attorney discretion as much as
possible, because limiting discretion weakens the ability of
conscientious attorneys to engage in discovery behavior
consistent with civil litigation's core values. This means that
both rules and protocols designed to prevent excessive
discovery (by reinforcing core values) and rules and protocols
designed to prevent abusive discovery (by constraining
unacceptable behavior) must accomplish their goals without
hindering the freedom of most attorneys to manage their
cases in a manner consistent with cultural norms.
The parts that follow offer expanded descriptions of
possible cultural solutions. Subpart B describes the benefits
of legal education and specialized "practice area" protocols
designed to steer would-be excessive discoverers back to civil
litigation's core values. Subpart C introduces the discovery
matrix, a new proposal for restraining the behavior that leads
to grossly excessive or abusive discovery while
simultaneously permitting the broad exercise of attorney
discretion in the discovery process.
B. Combating Excessive Discovery
1. Legal Education
One direct method of combating excessive discovery is to
directly (re)emphasize to law students and practicing lawyers
the importance of core values such as predictability,
efficiency, fairness, access to justice, and adjudication on the
merits. Legal education plays an important role both in
inculcating these values, and in providing concrete examples
198 [Vol. 52
HeinOnline  -- 52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 198 2012
PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY
of how they are expressed. This approach would reiterate in
the classroom, clinical experiences, and continuing legal
education courses both that a predictable, fair, and efficient
process is desirable, and that certain attorney behaviors tend
to promote those values.
To this end, greater pedagogical emphasis must be placed
on thinking about the broad discovery needs of each case-
and that emphasis must come from law schools, law firms,
and judges alike. Law schools must provide additional
opportunities to students to encounter the mechanics of
discovery in the context of running a specific case, either
through fictional scenarios presented in the classroom or
through clinical work. In a first year civil procedure course,
for example, students might examine the pleadings in a tort
or contract case to develop a discovery plan that sets out the
elements of proof, the evidence needed to satisfy those
elements, and the most efficient approach to unearth that
evidence through discovery. 188 The plan might also consider
the most systematic approach to discovery for that case:
which discovery tools should be used first, to gain
foundational information? In what order should depositions
be scheduled? How can requests for redundant or tangential
information be avoided?
Beyond law school, the legal community shares the
responsibility for training younger and less experienced
lawyers about how to think about discovery. This may take
the form of continuing legal education classes, informal
lectures, or attorney mentoring' 89 Some commentators have
expressed concern that preaching limitations on discovery
short of those permitted by the rules-including changing the
timing of discovery through mandatory initial disclosures-
188. This has been tried in some law schools. See, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson &
Charles E. Kirkwood, Teaching Civil Procedure with the Aid of Local Tort
Litigation, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 215, 222 (1987) (describing a program at the
University of Akron Law School in which students, among other things, must
develop a discovery strategy based on the limited information initially provided
to them as plaintiffs' or defense counsel); Elizabeth N. Schneider, Rethinking
the Teaching of Civil Procedure, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 41, 43-44 (1987) (explaining
a program at Brooklyn Law School in which students interview a client, draft a
complaint, draft a discovery plan, and draft a summary judgment motion).
189. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require a supervising lawyer
to make reasonable efforts to ensure that a lawyer under his or her supervision
complies with the Rules of Professional Conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.1(b) (2010).
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undermines the adversarial process. 9 °  Nothing about
developing a focused and efficient discovery plan, however,
discounts an attorney's ability to represent his client
zealously. Quite the opposite: carefully tailored discovery will
save the client time and money, allow counsel to focus more
intently on the core issues in the case and the evidence
necessary to prove or disprove a claim, and ingratiate counsel
with the judge. Reiterating the importance of efficient
discovery as a lawyering skill from the first semester of law
school, and onward throughout an attorney's career, is an
important first step to creating the cultural conditions in
which excessive discovery does not occur.
2. Practice Area Protocols
A second approach to combating excessive discovery is to
provide practicing attorneys with tools that make it easier for
them to behave consistent with civil litigation's core values.
For example, attorneys who have extensive experience with a
specific type of case might develop "practice area protocols,"
which would set out common forms and topics of discovery for
that particular case type. Such protocols would be designed
to help attorneys focus their discovery requests on materials
and information that are most likely to get to the heart of the
dispute.
This idea has already been implemented in some federal
jurisdictions. In the Northern District of Illinois, for instance,
the local patent bar worked with the court to develop a list of
materials and information that should be exchanged
automatically at the outset of discovery in a patent
infringement action, at the same time that ordinary initial
disclosures are exchanged under Rule 26(a)(1). 9' These
materials include documents that are likely to be requested
automatically by experienced patent counsel in any
190. See William H. Erickson, Limited Discovery and the Use of Alternative
Procedures for Dispute Resolution, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 303, 309 (1994);
Sorenson, supra note 18, at 693-94; Paul R. Sugarman & Marc G. Perlin,
Proposed Changes to Discovery Rules in Aid of "Tort Reform:" Has the Case Been
Made?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1465, 1476-77 (1993); Elizabeth G. Thornburg,
Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege,
69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 197 (1993).
191. See Local Patent Rules 2.1 Initial Disclosures, U.S. Dist. Court Northern
District of Illinois, available at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/homefLocalRules
.aspx?rtab=patentrules (last visited July 1, 2011).
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infringement case-documents such as the patent's file
wrapper, inventor's notebooks, a list of allegedly infringing
products, advertisements for sale of corresponding inventions,
and documents in the defendant's possession such as
engineering drawings, pertinent advertising, and sales data
for the accused products. Other specialty bars-such as
medical malpractice, employment discrimination,
construction defect, and the like-might similarly develop a
list of immediately exchangeable documents tailored to the
case type. Sensitive or confidential information listed in any
protocol could be subject to an automatic protective order, to
be issued by the court after all parties have filed an
appearance.
A similar approach has proven effective in the United
Kingdom. As part of the Woolf reforms of the late 1990s,
England and Wales now require the putative parties to
exchange certain types of information before a complaint can
be filed in particular case types. 192  To date, specialized
protocols have been developed for construction and
engineering disputes, defamation claims, personal injury
claims, resolution of clinical disputes, professional negligence,
judicial review, disease and illness claims, housing disrepair
cases, and certain landlord/tenant possession claims.' 91 While
the timing of these "pre-action protocols" is obviously
different than in the practice area protocols proposed here,
the effect of educating and focusing attorneys is largely the
same.
The potential benefit to practice area protocols is that
they effectuate a rough transfer of collective experience and
expertise to attorneys (and perhaps judges) who are
inexperienced or relatively unfamiliar with a particular
subject matter. 194 Treatises and legal research can provide
any competent practitioner with sufficient information on the
elements of a claim, statutory requirements, and judicial
192. See Notes to Accompany 53rd Update: Pre-Action Protocols, MINISTRY
OF JUSTICE, available at http:/www.justice.gov.uk/civilprocrules-fin/menus/
protocol.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
193. Id.
194. See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 4, at 412. Professors Burbank and
Subrin "would permit judges to compel or adjust the limitations in the protocol
as necessary or appropriate for a particular case." Id. I would not advocate for
such an unnecessary introduction of judicial discretion where attorneys are
better positioned to develop meaningful protocols.
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interpretations. In some jurisdictions, court-approved model
discovery requests are even available. 195  But much less
information is available on the specifics of procedural
strategy, or how an attorney might go about tailoring
discovery to get at the specific elements of a claim in the most
efficient and cost-effective manner.19
6
Practice area protocols would also help focus thinking
about the discovery needs in a case. Unlike the current
initial disclosures required under Rule 26(a)(1), whose need
for transsubstantive application substantially dilutes their
value, practice area protocols would emphasize the type of
information that is most likely to be useful in narrowing the
issues for a specific case type. A party receiving information
from the opposing side under a practice area protocol would
therefore be in a stronger position to drill down on the truly
necessary discovery going forward.
C. Combating Grossly Excessive or Abusive Discovery: The
Discovery Matrix
Both legal education and practice area protocols present
attorneys with information and procedural options designed
to revitalize appreciation for the core values of civil litigation.
These measures may well be sufficient to combat excessive
discovery in many cases. In instances of grossly excessive or
abusive discovery, however, such guidance is less likely to do
the trick. It is simply not practical to shore up core values
when those values are held very weakly or not at all. Rather,
more stringent measures must be taken to counter the effects
of abusive behavior during the discovery process.
Such measures should not target the exercise of attorney
discretion. This is the most important lesson of the cultural
model. Limiting attorney discretion has not reduced actual
instances of grossly excessive or abusive discovery, and at the
same time has hurt conscientious attorneys' ability to engage
195. See ABA, CML DIscOvERY STANDARDS 13 (1999) (advocating for the
development of form interrogatories "that presumptively will be deemed
appropriate form of inquiry"); see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CIV. PROC. § 2-421
(LexisNexis 2008).
196. Some attorneys have developed in-house protocols for certain case types,
see THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, IN THEIR WORDS: ATTORNEY
VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 23
(Federal Judicial Center 2010), but these are not necessarily shared beyond the
walls of a particular law firm.
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in discovery consistent with the litigation culture's core
values. Accordingly, a cultural approach to grossly excessive
and abusive discovery must find a way to restrict the volume
and cost of discovery in a given case without simultaneously
restricting the ability of attorneys to conduct discovery in the
manner they see fit.
As explained below, I believe the proper approach is to
establish a set of clear boundaries for acceptable discovery for
a given case, and provide a meaningful penalty for exceeding
those boundaries by shifting all further response costs to the
requesting party. Within the permitted boundaries, however,
an attorney would be allowed to exercise broad discretion as
to the type, scope, and order of her discovery requests. In
other words, attorneys would be able to request discovery in
whatever form they like until the established limit was
reached, at which point they would face the significant
disincentive of having to pay for any future requested
discovery.
The idea of cost-shifting is not new, but it has not yet
gained traction among rulemakers. Currently, the bulk of the
financial cost of discovery requests is borne by the responding
party except in the most unusual of circumstances.' 97
Professors Robert Cooter and Daniel Rubinfield, however,
have proposed a cost-shifting mechanism to counter some of
the consequences of discovery abuse. 9 ' The mechanism
envisions a "switching point" up to which each party pays its
own compliance costs, and beyond which the requesting party
bears all further reasonable compliance costs.1 99  The
switching point could be a monetary value or a specific
number of discovery requests, 00 but it should be set to
"ensure[] rough equality between the two parties' cost of
discovery."2 1 The switching point could be set in any of a
number of ways: it could trigger as soon as discretionary
197. See Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future:
Discovery Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 773, 774 (2011).
198. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfield, Reforming the
New Discovery Rules, 84 GEO. L.J. 61, 69-70 (1995) [hereinafter Cooter &
Rubinfield, Reforming]; Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfield, An Economic
Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 452-54 (1994).
199. Cooter & Rubinfield, Reforming, supra note 198, at 71.
200. Id. at 72-73.
201. Id. at 75.
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discovery (i.e., that not required by Rule 26(a)(1)) is
requested; after a presumptive limit is reached; based on the
court's calculation of average values for similar cases in the
past; or by statute.202 Cooter and Rubinfield explain that
their cost-shifting rule would generally make the requesting
party bear the cost of marginal discovery, eliminating the
incentives for abuse.20 3 The proposal would also make the
requesting party bear enough of its compliance costs to
equalize them, thereby reducing distortions in settlement
bargaining.20 4
Cooter and Rubinfield's approach is beautiful theory,
although its real-world application is considerably more
difficult.2 5 Under the current Federal Rules regime, it is
tough to determine where the switching point would occur in
any given case; even if that were possible, it would pose a
significant drain on judicial resources to make such
individualized determinations. Still, the notion of a switching
point at which discovery costs are shifted to the requesting
party bears careful consideration as a potential guiderail for
attorneys who are prone to grossly excessive or abusive
discovery. Unlike presumptive limits or judicial intervention,
a switching point allows parties the freedom to pursue any
form of discovery in any order, leaving the decisions about
how best to conduct discovery in the hands of those most
familiar with the facts and strategy of the case.
The switching point would be most viable and valuable if
it were established at the outset of the case. Parties would
then be free to conduct discovery in whatever manner they
saw fit until the switching point was reached, at which stage
the costs of responding would automatically shift to the
requesting party. Cost-shifting under this process would not
be treated as a punitive sanction and would not carry the
negative stigma of a sanction; it would simply be a
consequence of the choice to engage in far-ranging
discovery. 20 6 As an added benefit, removing cost-shifting from
202. Id. at 72-73.
203. Id. at 75.
204. Id.
205. For critiques of the proposal, see Cooper, supra note 87 at 465; see Bruce
L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481,
481-83 (1994).
206. See A. Leo Levin & Denise D. Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation,
37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 246-48 (1984).
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the pantheon of "sanctions" would likely encourage judges to
apply actual punitive sanctions more frequently and more
forcefully to discovery behavior that is truly abusive. °7
Only somewhat tongue-in-cheek, I call this cost-shifting
proposal the "Mongolian barbecue" approach to discovery.
Casual restaurants branding themselves as Mongolian
barbecue establishments became popular in the United States
about fifteen years ago. The restaurant concept is simple:
patrons purchase a bowl of a certain size and are invited to
fill it with an array of different uncooked foods-noodles,
meats, seafood, vegetables, spices and sauces.08 They then
hand the bowl to a chef, who cooks the food items together on
a massive grill. Patrons may fill the bowl with whatever
items they like in whatever proportion; the only rule is that
they can only fill as much as the bowl will hold.20 9
Modern discovery should work the same way. Parties
should be allotted a fixed amount of allowable discovery at
the outset of the case, which they may "fill" in any manner
they choose. They may elect not to fill to the allotted amount,
but they may not overfill. When the maximum level is
reached, they may obtain more discovery only by paying for it.
Judges would still retain the ability to issue protective orders
to prevent other types of abusive discovery practices.
Measuring the volume of discovery under the "Mongolian
barbecue" approach could be accomplished in several ways.
As one option, the court could set an actual monetary cap on
the amount of allowable discovery, and require the parties to
include in their discovery responses an invoice detailing how
much money was spent in responding. The invoice would
reflect attorney time, production costs, and travel costs. The
requesting party would then be able to track exactly how
207. See id. at 247. Rule 26(g) and Rule 37 allow the trial judge to sanction a
party or counsel for misbehavior in connection with discovery. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(g)(3); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b). Sanctions, however, are rarely granted except in
the most extreme instances of abusive behavior. See, e.g., Qualcomm, Inc. v.
Broadcom Corp., No. 05-CV-1958-B, 2008 WL 66932, *7-9 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7,
2008). Removing excessive requests from the ambit of the sanction rules would
send a signal to judges and counsel alike that intentional discovery abuse will
be treated differently and sanctioned accordingly.
208. See, e.g., Jane McManus, Offering More than Good Cuisine: Asian
Restaurant Adds Fun to Eating Experience, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS,
available at http://www.courierpress.com/news/2009/jul/20/offering-more-than.
good-cuisine-asian-fun-to/ (last visited Jul. 20, 2009).
209. Id.
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much was left in its "account" under the court-set cap. If a
responding party determined that it could not complete a
request without triggering the cost-shifting level, it would be
required to report this fact to the requesting party, who could
then revise the discovery request downward or elect to begin
paying the amount that exceeds the cap.
Calculating the actual amount spent on discovery would
not be prohibitively difficult. Attorneys already track, or
have the ability to track, the amount of time they spend on a
case, including discovery matters, usually in six-minute
increments. Detailed invoices are frequently attached to
requests for attorney fees filed with the court, and in any
event would have to be presented to opposing counsel once
cost-shifting occurred. Nevertheless, some might object to the
transfer of client billing information to opposing counsel
during ordinary stages of discovery. Another option therefore
would be to assign each form of discovery request a point
value, and cap discovery at a certain point threshold. When
the cap is exceeded, cost-shifting would automatically kick in.
For example, individual interrogatories or any sub-parts
might be assigned one point each, each hour of deposition two
points, and each document request two points. The court
might set a cap of, say, 100 points for a case of moderate
complexity and with a moderate amount in controversy;
parties would then be free to use their 100 points on 100
interrogatories, fifty hours of deposition, fifty requests for
production, or any combination thereof.
What remains is a meaningful way for the court to set
the cap. Here the absence of a clear, universal, textual
definition of "proportionality" (however the term is
understood as a cultural matter) looms large. If
proportionality were defined with reference to objective,
measurable criteria, the court would be able to set the outer
limits of "proportional" discovery in any civil case in a manner
that was universally understood and accepted. Moreover, a
consistent and recognized definition of proportionality would
allow the court to treat like cases alike in setting the cap, and
would provide attorneys with reasonable expectations about
where the cap would be set.
I therefore propose that "proportional" discovery should
be defined and understood in the Federal Rules in monetary
terms as a percentage of a civil case's stated amount in
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controversy, adjusted to account for the nature of suit and
complexity of the case. In practice, the judge would make a
proportionality determination in consultation with the parties
at the initial pretrial conference, by consulting a standardized
discovery matrix.20 The Y-axis of the matrix would contain
all possible case types by federal cause code, a fairly granular
breakdown based on the specific statutory provision or
common law basis for court jurisdiction. The X-axis of the
matrix would reflect the complexity of the case, as determined
by the judge and the parties based on criteria such as number
of claims, number of parties, and nature of the claims. The
"complexity" breakdown itself need not be elaborate; it might
simply differentiate between simple, standard, and complex
cases in the same manner that many courts already sort
actions for purposes of differentiated case management.21'
Within each box in the resulting grid would be two numbers:
a percentage and a dollar value. If the complaint sought
monetary damages, the amount of allowable discovery that a
party could spend prior to triggering automatic cost-shifting
would be the appropriate percentage from the grid multiplied
by the amount in controversy. If no money damages were
sought (for example, if the claimant sought injunctive relief or
specific performance), the absolute dollar value in the grid
would be the trigger point for cost-shifting.212
An illustration may help. Imagine a product liability
action in which the personal representatives of a factory
worker who died of liver cancer sue fifteen manufacturers
who provided vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) to the factory,
alleging that the worker was exposed to VCM at his job and
210. The matrix proposal discussed here was inspired by the idea of discovery
vouchers, first advocated, I believe, by Judges James K. Bredar, Paul Grimm,
and J. Frederick Motz of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. I
am indebted to Judge Bredar in particular for his willingness to share the
voucher idea with me.
211. See, e.g., Thomas H. Douthat, A Comparative Analysis of Efforts to
Improve Judicial Efficiency and Reduce Delay at the Local and State Level, 77
REV. JUR. U.P.R. 931, 941 (2008).
212. One commentator criticizes the notion of tying a proportionality
determination primarily to the amount in controversy because "monetizing of
what is 'at stake' is not so easy where the issue is not breach of contract but
constitutional or statutory civil rights." Carroll, supra note 4, at 465. The
absolute dollar value in the matrix is designed to alleviate such concerns by
establishing a fair and predictable default value based on information drawn
from thousands of prior similar cases.
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that the manufacturers failed in their duty to warn the
worker and those similarly situated that such exposure could
cause liver cancer. 213 The complaint alleges that the exposure
took place primarily during the 1950s and 1960s, and that the
decedent's carcinoma was diagnosed in 2000.214 The plaintiffs
seek monetary damages of $1,000,000. A hypothetical
discovery matrix might provide:
CAUSE SIMPLE STANDARD COMPLEX
28:1332
(Diversity: 3% 5% 10%
Product $30,000 $50,000 $100,000
Liability) I
In consultation with the parties, the judge determines
that this case should be considered complex because of the
number of named defendants and the fact that the alleged
activity occurred many decades in the past, making fact
witnesses and relevant documents potentially harder to
locate. Each side would accordingly be allowed to spend up to
$100,000, or 10% of the total amount in controversy, before
cost-shifting occurred. Note that the rule applies to each side
in the case, not each party; plaintiffs will have to be judicious
about what documents and interrogatory responses they
demand from each defendant, and defendants will have to
work collectively to choose appropriate deponents.
The numbers in this example-both the percentages and
dollar amounts-are offered for illustration only. The most
reasonable and effective figures for each box on the grid
should be determined by judges and lawyers with extensive
experience in each case type before the matrix is put into
formal use, and the numbers should be regularly revisited to
account for the effects of substantive and procedural law.
One can imagine several objections to cost-shifting
generally and the matrix proposal specifically, but none of
these objections is fatal. First is the concern that a plaintiff
or counterclaimant will artificially inflate the amount in
controversy in order to secure more discovery under the
213. VCM was used in the manufacture of the plastic polyvinyl chloride
(PVC). See Taylor v. Am. Chemistry Council, 576 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2009).
This hypothetical is based in part on the Taylor case. Id. at 21-22.
214. See id. at 22-23.
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matrix. More discovery for one party, however, means more
discovery for both, so unless there is a significant imbalance
of information between the parties, inflating the amount in
controversy is the pretrial equivalent of mutual assured
destruction. Where information imbalances do exist, for
example in some civil rights or employment claims, the
matrix could be set to provide each side with a different cap
on discovery. If the matrix itself does not dissuade a party
from misrepresenting the amount in controversy, Rule 11215
and the relevant Codes of Professional Conduct21 should.
Second, and more serious, is the objection that a party might
artificially inflate the amount it spends in responding to
discovery requests, in order to use up the requesting party's
"account" and hasten automatic cost-shifting. However, this
objection too can be addressed through early management-
either by using a uniform point system (such as the one
described above) for discovery tasks, or by allowing the court
to set out at the Rule 16 conference or as part of a standard
case management order the maximum amounts of time that
may be billed for any discovery event, or the reasonable
market value of attorney services associated with specific
discovery tasks.1 7
If used properly and consistently, the matrix approach
would provide a relatively predictable and efficient method of
focusing discovery. Attorneys who would not naturally think
about a case's full discovery needs from the outset of the
action would be more likely to do so because their clients
would bear the brunt of cost-shifting if discovery got out of
hand. The matrix would still allow a party or counsel to use
any mix of discovery methods, and over time attorneys might
become conditioned to reasonable limits on discovery, and
would be more likely to internalize the need for a
comprehensive discovery strategy.
215. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3) (stating that by signing a pleading or motion, an
attorney certifies to the court that "the factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after
a reasonable opportunity for investigation or discovery").
216. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2010) ("A lawyer
shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal
by the lawyer.").
217. See Redish & McNamara, supra note 197, at 812-22 (discussing cost-
shifting based on reasonable market value).
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The matrix also has significant advantages over the
current proportionality rules. It provides discovery
boundaries that are tailored to the needs of the case, and then
allows attorneys to exercise broad discretion within those
boundaries. Those boundaries are determined in consultation
with the judge at the start of discovery, based on prioritized
criteria, and provide a clear, predictable ceiling for discovery
activity. Unlike presumptive rules, which are both over- and
under- inclusive, matrix boundaries are fixed at an agreed-
upon point ahead of time. And attorney discretion makes it
more likely that a discovery request will advance the case
directly.
Most importantly, the matrix parallels the natural
operation of the civil litigation culture. Attorney discretion is
ordinarily bounded by cultural norms that promote the desire
for an efficient and predictable resolution of each case on the
merits, but attorneys operate freely within those bounds. The
amount in controversy and complexity of the case often
dictate whether a discovery tool will be used by creating an
unspoken, but understood, ceiling.
By contrast, the current rules offer unpredictable and
ineffective boundaries. Presumptive limits leave open the
possibility of even greater discovery, and the exercise of
judicial discretion is hampered by limited guidance. Rather
than encouraging the most well-informed people to make good
decisions based on clear boundaries and thoughtful guidance,
the current system encourages lesser-informed people to
make decisions based on no boundaries and murky guidance.
CONCLUSION
It is no small irony that the current proportionality rules
take a wholly disproportionate approach to containing
pretrial discovery. In an effort to address a severe problem
posed by a fraction of civil litigators, rulemakers have limited
the discretion of all attorneys, and have consequently hurt
the ability of most attorneys to resolve their cases in the most
efficient, fair, and predictable manner possible. Excessive
and abusive discovery must be addressed in a meaningful and
serious way, but restricting attorney discretion has proven to
be the wrong method.
We would do better to openly account for cultural effects
on rulemaking, and seek out solutions to excessive and
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abusive discovery that fit the prevailing cultural ethos. I
have attempted to initiate that discussion here. Of course, I
do not mean to hold out any of my proposals as a panacea.
Each proposal-particularly practice area protocols and the
discovery matrix-would require further research and careful
development before implementation. And, of course, they
would require buy-in from the key players in the civil justice
system. The challenge of implementing these proposals,
however, should not deter their fair consideration. Even
more importantly, debate over the details of any specific
proposal should not cloud the larger point that rules and
procedures are more likely to be used successfully if they
correspond to existing cultural norms. The proposed
discovery matrix would allow greater exercise of attorney
discretion in discovery matters, and is a closer approximation
to the cultural patterns that ordinarily keep discovery under
control than are the existing rule-based proportionality
limitations. If the matrix as proposed is not the ideal fit, let
us keep looking for a better model-but in any event a model
that is consistent with, and likely to reinforce, the core values
that define American civil litigation as we know it.
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